A. Mindful of Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996), in which in the context of determining the severability of a state statute regulating abortion the Supreme Court of the United States held that an explicit statement of legislative intent is controlling, it is the intent of the Legislature that every provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word in this act, and every application of the provisions in this act to every person, group of persons, or circumstances, are severable from each other.

B. If any application of any provision in this act to any person, group of persons, or circumstances is found by a court to be invalid, preempted, unconstitutional, or to impose an undue burden on any woman or group of women seeking an abortion, then the remaining applications of that provision to all other persons and circumstances shall be severed and preserved, and shall remain in effect. All constitutionally valid applications of the provisions in this act, and every application of those provisions that can be enforced without imposing an undue burden on women seeking abortions, shall be severed from any applications that a court finds to be invalid, preempted, unconstitutional, or to impose an undue burden on women seeking abortions, and the valid applications shall remain in force, because it is the Legislature's intent and priority that every valid application be allowed to stand alone. Even if a reviewing court finds a provision of this act to impose an undue burden in a large or substantial fraction of relevant cases, the applications that do not present an undue burden shall be severed from the remaining applications and shall remain in force, and shall be treated as if the Legislature had enacted a statute limited to the persons, group of persons, or circumstances for which the statute's application does not impose an undue burden.

C. The Legislature further declares that it would have enacted this act, and each provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word, and all constitutional applications of the provisions of this act, irrespective of the fact that any provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word, or applications of this act were to be declared invalid, preempted, unconstitutional, or to impose an undue burden.

D. If any provision of this act is found by any court to be unconstitutionally vague, then the applications of that provision that do not present constitutional vagueness problems shall be severed and remain in force, consistent with the severability requirements of subsections A, B, and C of this section.

E. No court may decline to enforce the severability requirements of subsections A, B, C, and D of this section on the ground that severance would “rewrite” the statute or involve the court in legislative or lawmaking activity. A court that declines to enforce or enjoins a state official from enforcing a statutory provision does not rewrite a statute, as the statute continues to contain the same words as before the court's decision. A judicial injunction or declaration of unconstitutionality:

F. If any state or federal court disregards the severability requirements of subsections A, B, C, D, and E of this section, and declares or finds any provision of this act facially unconstitutional, when there are discrete applications of that provision that can be enforced against a person, group of persons, or circumstances without violating federal law, the federal or state constitutions, or imposing an undue burden on women seeking abortions, then that provision shall be interpreted, as a matter of state law, as if the Legislature had enacted a provision limited to the persons, group of persons, or circumstances for which the provision's application will not violate federal law, the federal or state constitutions, or impose an undue burden on women seeking abortions, and every court shall adopt this saving construction of that provision until the court ruling that pronounced the provision facially unconstitutional is vacated or overruled.