Considering the Recommendations Contained in Staff's Electric Outage Investigation Report f...
NY-ADR
12/3/14 N.Y. St. Reg. PSC-48-14-00014-P
NEW YORK STATE REGISTER
VOLUME XXXVI, ISSUE 48
December 03, 2014
RULE MAKING ACTIVITIES
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
PROPOSED RULE MAKING
NO HEARING(S) SCHEDULED
I.D No. PSC-48-14-00014-P
Considering the Recommendations Contained in Staff's Electric Outage Investigation Report for MNRR, New Haven Line
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE State Administrative Procedure Act, NOTICE is hereby given of the following proposed rule:
Proposed Action:
The Commission is considering whether to require Con Edison to implement the recommendations contained in Department of Public Service's Staff investigation report of the September 2013 electric outage affecting the Metro-North Railroad, New Haven Line.
Statutory authority:
Public Service Law, sections 5, 65(1) and 66(2)
Subject:
Considering the recommendations contained in Staff's electric outage investigation report for MNRR, New Haven Line.
Purpose:
To consider the recommendations contained in Staff's electric outage investigation report for MNRR, New Haven Line.
Substance of proposed rule:
On November 13, 2014, Staff of the Department of Public Service (Staff) presented to the Public Service Commission (PSC) its investigation report of the September 2013 electric outage affecting the Metropolitan Transit Authority's Metro-North Railroad, New Haven Line. The report contains, among other things, a list of findings and recommendations that upon implementation by the utility are intended to eliminate or reduce the likelihood of a similar future event. The PSC is considering whether to require Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Con Edison) to implement the recommendations contained within Staff’s report. Specifically, Section 2.0 of the report makes certain findings and proposes the following specific recommendations to address operating deficiencies by Con Edison that were noted in the course of Staff’s electric outage investigation.
• Recommendation:
(1) Neither Con Edison nor MNRR should remove from service cable 38W09 to complete further upgrades at Mount Vernon substation until both sides have developed a plan that would reasonably ensure that should a failure of the single cable occur, MNRR will be able to provide uninterrupted service to its commuters of the New Haven Line.
(2) Con Edison should conduct a review of the current electric supply configurations for each of its railroad, subway, airports, water supply, and wastewater customers. Con Edison should determine whether design configuration similar to those present at MNRR’s Mount Vernon substation also exist for members of these customer groups.
If such N-1 configurations do exist, then prior to a planned outage of one of the electric supplies to a customer’s facilities, regardless of whether the outage is requested by the customer or Con Edison and scheduled to last 12 hours or more, Con Edison should take the following steps:
a) Inform the customer of the risk of a total loss of supply should the remaining supply fail or otherwise become unavailable;
b) Ascertain whether the customer has an alternative electric supply and a contingency plan should both Con Edison electric supplies become unavailable;
c) If the customer has an alternative electric supply, the customer’s senior management should provide in writing, with signature(s), a description of the alternative electric supply, its capability as a percentage of full service when compared with normal utility supply, the length of time that would be required to have the alternative supply providing service, its history of use and testing schedule;
d) If the level of service of the alternative supply or mitigation measures is less than 100% when compared with normal utility supply, the customer’s senior management should affirm, with signature(s) that this a satisfactory circumstance for its customers and the governmental agency that oversees or regulates its operations;
e) If the customer does not have an alternative electric supply, then the customer working with Con Edison should develop a contingency plan to either provide an additional source of supply or other mitigation measures. The alternative supply or mitigation measures under no circumstance should provide no less than 50% of full service when compared with normal utility supply and should be able to be placed in service in no less than twelve hours following the total loss of supply. Further, the customer’s senior management should affirm, with signature(s) that this a satisfactory circumstance for its customers and the governmental agency that oversees or regulates its operations;
f) Con Edison, at all times, should provide Staff with all of the above information two weeks prior to the intentional removal of an electric supply from service to a railroad, subway, airport, water supply or wastewater customer. Should circumstances arise that do not conform to the two week period, then the above information should be provided as soon as it is available, but no less than 24 hours prior to the outage.
Con Edison must not simply accept a railroad, subway, airport, water supply, and wastewater customer’s contingency plan for outages of power supplies or equipment requested by the customer. Con Edison needs to demonstrate that they understand the capabilities and limitations of the customer’s proposed plan and potential consequences. Con Edison should also alert the customer and its own senior management if the proposed plan is found to be inadequate.
(3) Con Edison’s freeze operation procedures, at a minimum, should be immediately revised to require the following:
1) temperatures of an adjacent cable(s) are to be continuously monitored at several locations to ascertain a satisfactory temperature profile along its exposed length;
2) temperatures of soils surrounding the cables are to be continuously monitored (the depth of soil penetration to be monitored to be provided by Con Edison engineering);
3) explicit instructions for personnel action to be taken in the event that the monitored temperatures of either the cable or soils are approaching dangerous levels (dangerous levels to be provided by Con Edison engineering); and
4) evaluations of the load characteristics are to be performed to assess atypical patterns or potential risks.
A full copy of Staff’s investigation report can be found on the Department of Public Service website (www.dps.ny.gov) under the Document and Matter Management (DMM) system by inserting case number 13-E-0529. The Commission may decide to approve, reject or modify the recommendations, in whole or in part. The Commission may also address related matters.
Text of proposed rule and any required statements and analyses may be obtained by filing a Document Request Form (F-96) located on our website http://www.dps.ny.gov/f96dir.htm. For questions, contact:
Deborah Swatling, Public Service Commission, 3 Empire State Plaza, Albany, New York 12223-1350, (518) 486-2659, email: [email protected]
Data, views or arguments may be submitted to:
Kathleen H. Burgess, Secretary, Public Service Commission, 3 Empire State Plaza, Albany, New York 12223-1350, (518) 474-6530, email: [email protected]
Public comment will be received until:
45 days after publication of this notice.
Regulatory Impact Statement, Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, Rural Area Flexibility Analysis and Job Impact Statement
Statements and analyses are not submitted with this notice because the proposed rule is within the definition contained in section 102(2)(a)(ii) of the State Administrative Procedure Act.
(13-E-0529SP1)
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