WPIC 130.02 Forgery—Making—Completing —Altering—Elements

Use bracketed material as applicable. Use this instruction for making, completing, or altering a written instrument, which is only one of the ways of committing forgery. For an instruction based on other ways of committing forgery, see WPIC 130.03 (Forgery—Possessing—Offering—Disposing of—Elements).

With this instruction, use WPIC 10.01 (Intent—Intentionally—Definition) and WPIC 130.10 (Written Instrument—Definition). Also use as applicable, WPIC 130.11 (Falsely Make—Definition), WPIC 130.12 (Falsely Complete—Definition) and WPIC 130.13 (Falsely Alter—Definition).

For a discussion of the phrase “this act” in element (3), see WPIC 4.20 (Introduction) and the Note on Use to WPIC 4.21 (Elements of the Crime—Form).

RCW 9A.60.020(1)(a).

To constitute forgery, the writing or instrument must be such that if genuine, it would have some legal efficacy or be the foundation of legal liability. E.g., State v. Scoby, 117 Wn.2d 55, 810 P.2d 1358, amended by 117 Wn.2d 55, 815 P.2d 1362 (1991) (passing a $1 bill with the corners of a $20 bill pasted onto it); State v. Tinajero, 154 Wn.App. 745, 228 P.3d 1282 (2009) (defendant's use of forged Social Security card jeopardized employer's compliance with immigration laws); State v. Daniels, 106 Wn.App. 571, 23 P.3d 1125 (2001) (department store charge slip signed by defendant purporting to sign on behalf of the cardholder). The fraudulent filling in of doctors' names by a pharmacist submitting prescription billing forms to the state for payment was not forgery. Submitting the names did not purport to be the acts of the doctors. Falsely representing in writing that a fact is true is not forgery. State v. Mark, 94 Wn.2d 520, 618 P.2d 73 (1980); State v. Marshall, 25 Wn.App. 240, 606 P.2d 278 (1980) (both cases interpreting the former forgery statutes RCW 9.44.010 and RCW 9.44.020). For a detailed discussion of legal efficacy, see State v. Smith, 72 Wn.App. 237, 864 P.2d 406 (1993).

Mere possession of a forged instrument is not sufficient to establish an intent to injure or defraud. State v. Vasquez, 178 Wn.2d 1, 309 P.3d 318 (2013).

The key to the “falsely make, complete or alter” alternative is whether a false or spurious document is made to appear to be other than it actually is. State v. Esquivel, 71 Wn.App. 868, 863 P.2d 113 (1993). The use of an assumed name on a withdrawal slip constituted a forgery when, in order to commit a fraud, the defendant had assumed the identity of a person who had been dead for several years. State v. Aitken, 79 Wn.App. 890, 905 P.2d 1235 (1995). A defendant signing “Pay to the order of” and his name on the back of a check did not commit forgery under the “falsely make, complete or alter” prong of 9A.60.020(1)(a). State v. Hescock, 98 Wn.App. 600, 989 P.2d 1251 (1999). A contractor who signed an owner's name to an “owner affidavit” without authority was properly convicted of forgery when, by signing the affidavit, the contractor falsely represented that the owner would be performing all work on the property and when the circumstances would support an inference that the contractor signed in order to conceal from the owners that he was not a registered contractor. State v. Soderholm, 68 Wn.App. 363, 842 P.2d 1039 (1993).

“Intent to injure” and “intent to defraud” are not alternative means of committing forgery requiring a unanimity instruction. State v. Simmons, 113 Wn.App. 29, 51 P.3d 828 (2002).

The unit of prosecution for a forgery is each written instrument that is put off as true. State v. Williams, 118 Wn.App. 178, 73 P.3d 376 (2003).

It is not a defense to a charge of forgery that the defendant intended to repay the money received from a forged check—intentions for the future are irrelevant. State v. Edwards, 51 Wn.App. 763, 755 P.2d 821 (1988).