WPIC 120.02 Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer—Elements

With this instruction use WPIC 120.02.01 (Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer—Willfully—Definition) and WPIC 10.02 (Knowledge—Knowingly—Definition).

In element (3) choose from among the bracketed phrases depending on whether the case is in superior, municipal, or district court. See WPIC 4.20 (Introduction). For a discussion of the phrase “any of these acts” in element (3), see WPIC 4.20 (Introduction) and the Note on Use to WPIC 4.21 (Elements of the Crime—Form).

For cases involving giving a false or misleading statement to a law enforcement officer, use WPIC 120.04 (Making a False or Misleading Statement to a Public Servant—Elements) instead of this instruction.

RCW 9A.76.020.

Some conduct, as opposed to mere speech, is required to sustain a conviction for obstructing a law enforcement officer. State v. Williams, 171 Wn.2d 474, 485–46, 251 P.3d 877 (2011). Furthermore, the conduct must amount to more than slight inconveniences or annoyances. “[O]bstruction statutes may not be used to limit citizens' right to express verbal criticism, even abusive criticism, at police officers.” State v. E.J.J., 183 Wn.2d 497, 507, 354 P.3d 815 (2015) (citing City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 454, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987)). However, the Supreme Court noted in E.J.J. that the outcome of the case “would certainly be different if E.J.J.'s speech fell within one of the unprotected speech categories.” State v. E.J.J., 183 Wn.2d at 503–04 n.7.

The State cannot rely on evidence that the defendant made false statements to law enforcement officers to convict the defendant of obstruction by conduct which delays, hinders, or obstructs. State v. Williamson, 84 Wn.App. 37, 924 P.2d 960 (1996). See WPIC 120.04 (Making False or Misleading Statement to a Public Servant—Elements).

A provision of a parallel Seattle ordinance prohibiting “obstructing a public officer” by refusal to leave the scene of a criminal investigation upon request was upheld against vagueness and overbreadth challenges. City of Seattle v. Abercrombie, 85 Wn.App. 393, 945 P.2d 1132 (1997).

In City of Sunnyside v. Wendt, 51 Wn.App. 846, 755 P.2d 847 (1988), the defendant was convicted of violating a city ordinance similar to RCW 9A.76.020(3) by refusing to produce his driver's license to a police officer investigating an accident involving the defendant. The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, finding that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague.

The statute defines “law enforcement officer” as “any general authority, limited authority, or specially commissioned Washington police officer or federal police officer as those terms are defined in RCW 10.93.020, and other public officers who are responsible for enforcement of fire, building, zoning, and life and safety codes.” Depending upon the question presented, it may be appropriate to draft an instruction defining “law enforcement officer,” based on the relevant provisions of RCW 10.93.020.

A police officer who is also employed as a private security guard has authority to act as a police officer, and therefore is acting in the discharge of official duties, “whenever the officer reasonably believes that a crime is committed in his or her presence, whether the officer is on duty or off duty.” State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 722, 927 P.2d 227 (1996). See also State v. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d 460, 901 P.2d 286, 50 A.L.R.5th 921 (1995) (“official duties” for purposes of assault on law enforcement officer statute, may include unlawful arrest).

See also the Comments to WPIC 35.23.02 (Assault—Third Degree—Law Enforcement Officer—Elements) (including for a discussion of the scope of the defense for coming to the aid of a person who is being arrested) and WPIC 120.06 (Resisting Arrest—Elements).