WPIC 86.02 Threatening to Bomb or Injure Property—Elements
11A WAPRAC WPIC 86.02Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal
11A Wash. Prac., Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC 86.02 (5th Ed)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal
January 2024 Update
Part X. Arson and Related Crimes
WPIC CHAPTER 86. Other Property Crimes
WPIC 86.02 Threatening to Bomb or Injure Property—Elements
To convict the defendant of threatening to bomb or injure property, each of the following two elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That on or about (date), the defendant
[(a)] [threatened to bomb or otherwise injure a [public or private school building] [or] [a place of worship or public assembly] [or] [governmental property] [or] [[a] [any other] building or structure] [or] [a common carrier] [or] [a place used for human occupancy] [or]
[(b)] [communicated [or repeated] any information concerning a threat to bomb or otherwise injure a [public or private school building] [or] [a place of worship or public assembly] [or] [governmental property] [or] [[a] [any other] building or structure] [or] [a common carrier] [or] [a place used for human occupancy]; and
(i) That the defendant acted knowing such information was false; and
(ii) That the defendant acted with the intent to alarm the person [or persons] to whom the information was communicated [or repeated]];
and
(2) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.
If you find from the evidence that element (2) and either of the alternative elements (1)(a) or (1)(b) have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty. To return a verdict of guilty, the jury need not be unanimous as to which of alternatives (1)(a) or (1)(b) has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as long as each juror finds that at least one alternative has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If your finding is based on alternative element (1)(b), both (i) and (ii) must be proved.
On the other hand, if, after weighing all of the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to either element (1) or (2), then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.
NOTE ON USE
Use paragraphs (i) and (ii) only if element (1)(b) is given.
WPIC 2.24 (Threat—Definition) and WPIC 2.05 (Building—Definition) may be used with this instruction, if appropriate.
WPIC 10.01 (Intent—Intentionally—Definition) and WPIC 10.02 (Knowledge—Knowingly—Definition) may be used with this instruction if the defendant is charged with communicating or repeating information concerning a threat to bomb or injure property. Do not use WPIC 10.01 (Intent—Intentionally—Definition) or WPIC 10.02 (Knowledge—Knowingly—Definition) if the defendant is charged only with threatening to bomb or injure property and is not charged with communicating or repeating information concerning a threat to bomb or injure property.
Use bracketed material as applicable. The instruction is drafted for cases in which the jury needs to be instructed using two or more of the alternatives for element (1). Care must be taken to limit the alternatives to those that were included in the charging document and are supported by sufficient evidence. For directions on when and how to draft instructions with alternative elements, see WPIC 4.20 (Introduction) and the Note on Use and Comment to WPIC 4.23 (Elements of the Crime—Alternative Elements—Alternative Means for Committing a Single Offense—Form). For any case in which substantial evidence supports only one of the alternatives in element (1), revise the instruction to remove references to alternative elements, following the format set forth in WPIC 4.21 (Elements of the Crime—Form).
For a discussion of the phrase “this act” in element (2), see WPIC 4.20 (Introduction) and the Note on Use to WPIC 4.21 (Elements of the Crime—Form).
COMMENT
RCW 9.61.160(1).
The first clause of RCW 9.61.160(1) makes it unlawful to threaten to bomb or otherwise injure certain buildings, structures, common carriers, or places. The second clause makes it unlawful to communicate or repeat information regarding a threatened bombing or injury. “The first clause does not require any specific intent; it merely requires proof of the threat. In contrast, the second clause requires (1) knowledge of the falsity of the information and (2) an intent to alarm the listener.” State v. Edwards, 84 Wn.App. 5, 9, 924 P.2d 397 (1996), overruled in part by State v. Johnston, 156 Wn.2d 355, 362–63, 127 P.3d 707 (2006).
Threat to property is defined in RCW 9A.04.110: “Threat means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent … to cause physical damage to the property of a person other than the actor.”
The threat must be a “true threat” to support a conviction under RCW 9.61.160. See State v. Johnston, 156 Wn.2d 355, 366, 127 P.3d 707 (2006). For a discussion of how to instruct jurors about true threats, see the Comment to WPIC 2.24 (Threat—Definition).
The statute does not require that the threat be one that the defendant intends to carry out. See State v. Johnston, 156 Wn.2d at 362.
[Current as of May 2019.]
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