WPIC 61.02 Vehicle Prowling—First Degree—Elements
11A WAPRAC WPIC 61.02Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal
11A Wash. Prac., Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC 61.02 (5th Ed)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal
January 2024 Update
Part IX. Crimes Against Property
WPIC CHAPTER 61. Vehicle Prowling
WPIC 61.02 Vehicle Prowling—First Degree—Elements
To convict the defendant of the crime of vehicle prowling in the first degree, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That on or about (date), the defendant unlawfully entered or remained in [a motor home] [a vessel equipped for propulsion by mechanical means or by sail and that has a cabin equipped with permanently installed sleeping quarters or cooking facilities];
(2) That the entering or remaining was with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein; and
(3) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.
If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.
On the other hand, if, after weighing all of the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to any one of these elements, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.
NOTE ON USE
Use bracketed material as applicable.
With this instruction, use WPIC 10.01 (Intent—Intentionally—Definition) and WPIC 65.02 (Enters or Remains Unlawfully—Definition), substituting the words “motor home” or “vessel” for the word “premises.” As applicable, also use WPIC 61.05 (Motor Home—Definition).
For a discussion of the phrase “this act” in element (3), see WPIC 4.20 (Introduction) and the Note on Use to WPIC 4.21 (Elements of the Crime—Form).
COMMENT
RCW 9A.52.095.
Under some circumstances, it may be necessary to specify and define the crime alleged to have been intended by the defendant, if the defendant so requests.
The definition of the offense includes the element of intent to commit a crime. In State v. Bergeron, 105 Wn.2d 1, 711 P.2d 1000 (1985), a burglary case, the court held that because the statutory definition of burglary referred simply to an intent to commit a crime, the State was not required to prove an intent to commit a specific crime, and it was sufficient to instruct the jury in the language of the statutory definition.
The court in Bergeron acknowledged the possibility that in some cases, the specific crime intended may be material to the defendant's theory of the case as, for example, when the defendant claims to have entered or remained in the premises for some lawful purpose. In this situation, the court said, the defendant's remedy is to move for a bill of particulars and to then propose supplementary instructions that will permit the defendant to argue his or her theory of the case.
[Current as of May 2018.]
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