WPIC 39.16 Unlawful Imprisonment—Elements

Use WPIC 10.02 (Knowledge—Knowingly—Definition) and WPIC 39.17 (Unlawful Imprisonment—“Without Consent”—Definition) with this instruction.

Use the bracketed element (5) if facts exist to suggest that the defendant had a good faith belief that he or she had legal authority. State v. Dillon, 12 Wn.App.2d 133, 141–43, 456 P.3d 1199 (2020). See discussion in Comment.

For a discussion of the phrase “any of these acts” in the jurisdictional element, see WPIC 4.20 (Introduction) and the Note on Use to WPIC 4.21 (Elements of the Crime—Form).

RCW 9A.40.040; RCW 9A.40.010(6). This instruction has been revised for this edition. See comment below.

“Knowingly restrained.” In order to establish the crime of unlawful imprisonment, the State must prove that the defendant “knowingly restrain[ed] another person.” RCW 9A.40.040. Per RCW 9A.40.010(6), the word “restrain” has four components, as explained by the Court of Appeals in State v. Warfield, 103 Wn.App. 152, 157, 5 P.3d 1280 (2000):

The prior version of this instruction followed the holding in Warfield that held that “knowingly” modified all four of these components of “restrain.” State v. Warfield, 103 Wn.App. 157, 5 P.3d 1280 (2000). However, in State v. Johnson, 180 Wn.2d 295, 303, 325 P.3d 135 (2014), the Washington Supreme Court limited Warfield's holding “to those unique cases where the defendant had a good faith belief that he or she had legal authority to imprison a person.” Applying the holding in Johnson, the Court of Appeals commented in a footnote that the prior WPIC 39.16 “contains an incorrect statement of the law.” State v. Dillon, 12 Wn.App.2d 133, 143 n.1, 456 P.3d 1199 (2020).

The instruction has accordingly been revised for this edition. The instruction now distinguishes among the knowledge requirement for the different elements. In all cases, the State must prove that the defendant (a) knowingly restrained the movements of the victim in a manner that substantially interfered with his or her liberty and (b) knew that this restraint was “without consent.” The State is not, however, generally required to prove that the defendant knew that he or she lacked legal authority for the restraint.

Significantly, the Warfield court specifically did not overrule State v. Price, 33 Wn.App. 472, 655 P.2d 1191 (1982), which held that knowledge of the victim's age is not an element of unlawful imprisonment. In a case involving restraint of a child less than sixteen years of age, the trial court will need to analyze these two cases to determine whether the “knowledge” element requires proof that the defendant knew that the child was under sixteen and therefore incapable of acquiescing to the restraint.

Lesser included offense. Unlawful imprisonment is a lesser included offense of kidnapping. State v. Davis, 177 Wn.App. 454, 311 P.3d 1278 (2013).

Other case law. In State v. Worrell, 111 Wn.2d 537, 761 P.2d 56 (1988), a prosecution for kidnapping, the Supreme Court held that the definition of “restrain” contained in RCW 9A.40.010(1) was not unconstitutionally vague. Accord State v. Kinchen, 92 Wn.App. 442, 963 P.2d 928 (1998) (unlawful imprisonment prosecution of parent for restraining child).

The “incompetency exception” requires more than incapacity. Only if a legal guardian (or person in similar fiduciary role) has been appointed and failed to give consent does the exception apply. State v. Simms, 95 Wn.App. 910, 977 P.2d 647 (1999).

The defense of acquiescence does not apply to a victim less than 16 years of age. State v. Ayala, 108 Wn.App. 480, 31 P.3d 58 (2001).