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WPIC 36.23 Stalking—Harass—Definition

11 WAPRAC WPIC 36.23Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal

11 Wash. Prac., Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC 36.23 (5th Ed)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal
January 2024 Update
Washington State Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions
Part VI. Crimes Against Personal Security
WPIC CHAPTER 36. Harassment, Hate Crimes, and Domestic Violence
WPIC 36.23 Stalking—Harass—Definition
“To harass” means to carry out a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct must be one that would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress and which actually causes the person to suffer substantial emotional distress [or, when the course of conduct is contact by a person over age eighteen that would cause a reasonable parent to fear for the well-being of their child].
“Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, demonstrating the same purpose.
“Willful” or “willfully” means to act purposefully, not inadvertently or accidentally.
NOTE ON USE
This instruction defines the word “harass” in the stalking to-convict instructions, WPIC 36.21 through WPIC 36.21.07.
COMMENT
RCW 9A.46.110(6)(c); RCW 10.14.020.
In most instances, a “willful” act is an act done knowingly. See WPIC 10.05 (Willfully—Definition). RCW 9A.08.010(4) provides, however, that acting knowingly satisfies the requirement of willfulness unless the law plainly imposes a requirement of more than knowledge. Because the Legislature has chosen to use the phrase “knowing and willful course of conduct” in RCW 10.14.020(2) (emphasis added), it is the WPI Committee's view that this is such an instance. For the phrase “purposefully, not accidentally or inadvertently,” see State v. Hall, 104 Wn.2d 486, 493, 706 P.2d 1074 (1985) (Justice Durham, dissenting). See also State v. Hudson, 56 Wn.App. 490, 784 P.2d 533 (1990), and the discussion in the Comment to WPIC 120.02.01 (Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer—Willfully—Definition).
The statute also provides that “[c]onstitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’” RCW 10.14.020(1).
[Current as of April 2020.]
End of Document