WPIC 35.30.01 Inference of Reckless Conduct—Drive-by Shooting

Use this instruction only in cases in which it is justified under the evidence. See discussion of inferences in the Comment. Use the bracketed phrase only if there is evidence on that issue.

RCW 9A.36.045(2).

An instruction similar to WPIC 35.30.01 was approved by the Court of Appeals in State v. Washington, 66 Wn.App. 228, 831 P.2d 787 (1992). This instruction is patterned after WPIC 60.05 (Inference of Intent—Entering or Remaining Unlawfully). That instruction, which explains the inference of intent under the burglary statute, was upheld both in State v. Johnson, 100 Wn.2d 607, 674 P.2d 145 (1983), and State v. Bergeron, 105 Wn.2d 1, 711 P.2d 1000 (1985). For further discussion see the Comment to WPIC 60.05 (Inference of Intent—Entering or Remaining Unlawfully).

As with other inferences, trial courts should carefully consider the facts of the particular case when determining whether to instruct the jury on the permissible inference. See discussion in State v. Farr-Lenzini, 93 Wn.App. 453, 468–70, 970 P.2d 313 (1999) (inferring reckless driving from excessive speed). Inferences are also discussed in several other Comments. See the Comments to: WPIC 95.03 (Excessive Speed—Inference of Reckless Driving); WPIC 38.22 (Dependent Person—Definition); and WPIC 60.05 (Inference of Intent—Entering or Remaining Unlawfully).

For a discussion of case law addressing the drive-by shooting statute, see the Comment to WPIC 35.31 (Drive-By Shooting—Elements).