WPIC 29.02 Controlled Substances Homicide—Elements
11 WAPRAC WPIC 29.02Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal
11 Wash. Prac., Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC 29.02 (5th Ed)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal
January 2024 Update
Part V. Crimes Against Life
WPIC CHAPTER 29. Miscellaneous Crimes Against Life
WPIC 29.02 Controlled Substances Homicide—Elements
To convict the defendant of the crime of controlled substances homicide each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That on or about (date), the defendant unlawfully delivered [(name of substance)] [a controlled substance] to (name of decedent);
(2) That delivery of [name of substance] [the controlled substance] occurred in the State of Washington;
(3) That the defendant knew that the substance delivered was [a controlled substance] [(name of substance) ];
(4) That (name of decedent) subsequently used the substance delivered by the defendant; and
(5) That use of the substance delivered by the defendant was a proximate cause of the death of (name of decedent).
If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.
On the other hand if, after weighing all of the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to any one of these elements, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.
NOTE ON USE
Use WPIC 10.02 (Knowledge—Knowingly—Definition), WPIC 50.07 (Delivery—Definition), and WPIC 25.02 (Homicide—Proximate Cause—Definition) with this instruction. If the term “controlled substance” is used in the instruction, also use WPIC 50.50 (Controlled Substance—Definition).
Use bracketed material as applicable.
COMMENT
RCW 69.50.415.
The statute requires that the use of the drugs “result in” the death of the user. This is synonymous with a requirement of proximate causation. Use of the drugs need not be the sole cause of the death. It is sufficient if that use is a cause of the death. State v. Christman, 160 Wn.App. 741, 249 P.3d 680 (2011); cf. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 134 S.Ct. 881, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014) (under similar federal statute, government must prove that death would not have occurred but for use of the drugs delivered by the defendant).
The statute provides: “A person who unlawfully delivers a controlled substance in violation of RCW 69.50.401(2)(a), (b), or (c) which controlled substance is subsequently used by the person to whom it was delivered, resulting in the death of the user, is guilty of controlled substances homicide.” The cited statutory provisions relate to delivery of substances that are classified in schedules I, II, or III. The statute does not apply to delivery of controlled substances from schedules IV or V. State v. Zillyette, 178 Wn.2d 153, 307 P.3d 712 (2013).
Because the delivery must violate the specified statute, the WPI Committee believes that the delivery must occur in the State of Washington. Proof of this fact necessarily establishes that the crime was committed in the state “in part,” which is sufficient to establish jurisdiction under RCW 9A.04.030(1). For this reason, no other jurisdictional element has been included.
Element (3) of this instruction is based on State v. Boyer, 91 Wn.2d 342, 588 P.2d 1151 (1979), which holds that guilty knowledge, an understanding of the identity of the product being delivered, is an element of delivery of a controlled substance under RCW 69.50.401(2)(a) even though such knowledge is not specified as an element in RCW 69.50.401(2)(a).
[Current as of May 2019.]
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