Home Table of Contents

WPIC 26.06 Murder—First Degree—Indifference to Human Life—Elements

11 WAPRAC WPIC 26.06Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal

11 Wash. Prac., Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC 26.06 (5th Ed)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal
January 2024 Update
Washington State Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions
Part V. Crimes Against Life
WPIC CHAPTER 26. Murder, First Degree
WPIC 26.06 Murder—First Degree—Indifference to Human Life—Elements
To convict the defendant of the crime of murder in the first degree, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That on or about (date), the defendant created a grave risk of death to another person;
(2) That the defendant knew of and disregarded the grave risk of death;
(3) That the defendant engaged in that conduct under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life;
(4) That (name of decedent) died as a result of defendant's acts; and
(5) That any of these acts occurred in the State of Washington.
If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.
On the other hand, if after weighing all of the evidence you have a reasonable doubt as to any one of these elements, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.
NOTE ON USE
This instruction is intended to cover only RCW 9A.32.030(1)(b). If there is an issue of causal connection, use WPIC 25.02 (Homicide—Proximate Cause—Definition).
For a discussion of the phrase “any of these acts” in element (5), see WPIC 4.20 (Introduction) and the Note on Use to WPIC 4.21 (Elements of the Crime—Form).
COMMENT
RCW 9A.32.030(1)(b).
The instruction's second element now includes a requirement that the defendant knew of and disregarded the grave risk of death. State v. Barstad, 93 Wn.App. 553, 568, 970 P.2d 324 (1999), held that RCW 9A.32.030(1)(b)'s phrase “under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life” requires a subjective mental state: that the defendant must “know of and disregard the fact his conduct presents a grave risk of death to others.” The prior version of the instruction has been held constitutionally adequate, even though it omitted any express reference to the subjective mental state. In re Caldellis, 187 Wn.2d 127, 385 P.2d 135 (2016).
If a defense of excuse or justification is raised, then the question arises whether the defense tends to negate an element of the crime. If it does, then the concerns discussed in WPIC 14.00 (Defenses—Introduction) apply and the State may have the burden of proving the absence of excuse or justification. See State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wn.2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014) (when a defense necessarily negates an element of the crime, it violates due process to place the burden of proof on the defendant, and the key to determining whether a defense necessarily negates an element is whether the completed crime and the defense can coexist). For further discussion of defenses, see the Comment to WPIC 26.04 (Murder—First Degree—Felony—Elements).
For murders committed in 1997 or earlier, the State would be required to prove that death occurred within three years and a day of the defendant's act (or, for murders committed in 1983 or earlier, within one year and a day).
[Current as of April 2019.]
End of Document