WPIC 25.02 Homicide—Proximate Cause—Definition

Use bracketed material as applicable.

The first two paragraphs should be given in all homicide cases in which there is an issue of causal connection between defendant's act and the death of the decedent. Do not use this instruction for vehicular homicide cases; instead use WPIC 90.07 (Vehicular Homicide and Assault—Proximate Cause—Definition).

The bracketed third paragraph should always be used when the evidence supports multiple proximate causes. It should always be included when WPIC 25.03 (Conduct of Another) is given.

Cause of death is a question of fact. State v. Engstrom, 79 Wn.2d 469, 476, 487 P.2d 205 (1971). When an unforeseeable act breaks the causal connection between the original act and the injury, such intervening cause may excuse the defendant from legal accountability. State v. Little, 57 Wn.2d 516, 522, 358 P.2d 120 (1961). In State v. Perez-Cervantes, 141 Wn.2d 468, 6 P.3d 1160 (2000), the court held that the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to show that the victim's drug use after the stabbing or failure to promptly seek medical attention following release from the hospital was an intervening cause of death. In State v. Bauer, 180 Wn.2d 929, 329 P.3d 67 (2014), the Supreme Court found that causation in a criminal law is different from causation in tort law. Legal causation in regards to a criminal case is narrower than legal causation in tort cases. Following Bauer, the Court of Appeals has continued to cite this instruction with approval. State v. Harris, 199 Wn.App. 137, 148, 398 P.3d 1229 (2017).

In State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609, 801 P.2d 193 (1990), the Supreme Court found that WPIC 25.02 pertains to “cause in fact”, the “but for” consequences of an act, and not “legal causation.” In Dennison, the defendant argued that the trial court should have given WPIC 25.02, because the decedent's felonious acts superseded the defendant's acts when the decedent overreacted under circumstances not reasonably foreseeable. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the defendant confused the two elements of proximate cause, cause in fact and legal causation. For a more detailed discussion of “cause in fact” and “legal causation,” see the Comment to WPI 15.01 (Proximate Cause—Definition), 6 Washington Practice, Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil (7th ed.).

In State v. Leech, 114 Wn.2d 700, 790 P.2d 160 (1990), a prosecution for first degree felony murder, the court rejected the argument that an instruction based on WPIC 25.02 unconstitutionally relieved the State of proving an element of proximate cause because the instruction did not state that proximate cause is limited by foreseeability. The court held that foreseeability is not an element of proximate cause and that the instruction given “properly stated the law and was not unconstitutional.”

See the Comment to WPIC 90.02 (Vehicular Homicide—Elements) for a discussion of the proximate cause requirements under the vehicular homicide statute.