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WPIC 2.13 Malice—Maliciously—Definition

11 WAPRAC WPIC 2.13Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal

11 Wash. Prac., Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC 2.13 (5th Ed)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal
January 2024 Update
Washington State Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions
Part I. General Instructions
WPIC CHAPTER 2. Definitions
WPIC 2.13 Malice—Maliciously—Definition
Malice and maliciously mean an evil intent, wish, or design to vex, annoy, or injure another person.
[Malice may be, but is not required to be, inferred from an act done in willful disregard of the rights of another.]
NOTE ON USE
Use bracketed material as applicable. For directions on using bracketed phrases, see WPIC 4.20 (Introduction).
COMMENT
RCW 9A.04.110(12).
The statute provides that “malice” and “maliciously” shall import an “evil intent, wish, or design to vex, annoy or injure another person.” The statute also provides that malice may be inferred from “an act done in willful disregard of the rights of another, or an act wrongfully done without just cause or excuse, or an act or omission of duty betraying a willful disregard of social duty.”
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Washington Supreme Court adopted the rule that a permissive inference is valid if there is a “rational connection” between the inferred fact and the proven fact and the inferred fact flows “more likely than not” from the proven fact. See County Court of Ulster Cnty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979); State v. Johnson, 100 Wn.2d 607, 674 P.2d 145 (1983), overruled on other grounds by State v. Bergeron, 105 Wn.2d 1, 711 P.2d 1000 (1985). Earlier cases finding the statutory inference of malice to be unconstitutional relied on a now-discredited analysis of the required factual link and are no longer persuasive. Bellevue v. Kinsman, 34 Wn.App. 786, 664 P.2d 1253 (1983); State v. Johnson, 23 Wn.App. 605, 596 P.2d 1047 (1979).
The Court of Appeals in State v. Ratliff, 46 Wn.App. 325, 730 P.2d 716 (1986), applying the “rational connection” test adopted in Ulster and Johnson, held that the trial court did not err in instructing that malice may be inferred from “an act done in willful disregard of the rights of another.” The court found, under the facts of the case, that there was a rational connection between the proven fact and the inference of malice. In view of Ratliff, the WPI Committee has included this inference in WPIC 2.13. However, it is not clear whether malice may be inferred from an “act wrongfully done without just cause or excuse, or an act or omission of duty betraying a willful disregard of social duty” under the “rational connection” test. Washington appellate courts have not addressed these inferences subsequent to the adoption of the “rational connection” test. For this reason, the WPI Committee has not included these other two inferences in the instruction. For a discussion of the validity of these two inferences under the “rational connection test,” see Fine, 13A Washington Practice, Criminal Law and Sentencing § 3:11 (3d ed.).
A further discussion of the potential pitfalls of instructing the jury regarding a permissive inference in a criminal case is found in the Comment to WPIC 94.04 (Excessive Speed—Inference of Driving in a Reckless Manner).
[Current as of November 2018.]
End of Document