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WPIC 300.31 Aggravating Circumstance—Law Enforcement Victim [RCW 9.94A.535(3)(v)]

11A WAPRAC WPIC 300.31Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal

11A Wash. Prac., Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC 300.31 (5th Ed)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal
January 2024 Update
Washington State Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions
Part XVI. Exceptional Sentences—Aggravating Circumstances
WPIC CHAPTER 300. Exceptional Sentences—Aggravating Circumstances
WPIC 300.31 Aggravating Circumstance—Law Enforcement Victim [RCW 9.94A.535(3)(v)]
(The WPI Committee believes that no further explanation of this aggravating circumstance is required.)
NOTE ON USE
For the aggravating circumstance involving a law enforcement victim, use the applicable bracketed clause in WPIC 300.02 (Aggravating Circumstance Procedure—Factors Alleged—Unitary Trial) or WPIC 300.06 (Aggravating Circumstance Procedure—Factors Alleged—Bifurcated Trial or Stand-Alone Sentencing Proceeding). Also, to define a term used in that bracketed language, use WPIC 10.02 (Knowledge—Knowingly—Definition) if not already defined.
COMMENT
RCW 9.94A.535(3)(v).
This aggravating circumstance was added to the Sentencing Reform Act in 2005. The accompanying legislative history indicates that the statutory language was designed to codify existing common law aggravating circumstances. Laws of 2005, Chapter 68, § 1 (effective April 15, 2005).
Under the common law, this aggravating circumstance supports an exceptional sentence in assault and attempted homicide cases in which the victim's status as a police officer is not already an element that increases the severity of the crime. State v. Ramires, 109 Wn.App. 749, 37 P.3d 343 (attempted first degree murder case); State v. Anderson, 72 Wn.App. 453, 864 P.2d 1001 (1994) (first degree assault). Accord, State v. Gipson, 191 Wn.App. 780, 364 P.3d 850 (2015) (third degree assault).
For this aggravating circumstance to apply, the victim must be performing official duties at the time of the crime. In one case, the defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm that another person had stolen from a murdered police officer. Because the officer was no longer performing official duties at the time of the defendant's crime, this aggravating circumstance did not apply. State v. Davis, 176 Wn.App. 849, 882–83, 315 P.3d 1105 (2013), reversed on other grounds, 182 Wn.2d 222, 340 P.3d 820 (2014).
The statutory presumption is that this aggravating circumstance will be presented to the jury during the trial of the alleged crime. RCW 9.94A.537(4).
[Current as of April 2019.]
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