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WPIC 77.21 Possessing a Stolen Motor Vehicle—Elements

11A WAPRAC WPIC 77.21Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal

11A Wash. Prac., Pattern Jury Instr. Crim. WPIC 77.21 (5th Ed)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal
January 2024 Update
Washington State Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions
Part IX. Crimes Against Property
WPIC CHAPTER 77. Possessing Stolen Property
WPIC 77.21 Possessing a Stolen Motor Vehicle—Elements
To convict the defendant of the crime of possessing a stolen motor vehicle, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That on or about (date), the defendant knowingly [received] [retained] [possessed] [concealed] [disposed of] a stolen motor vehicle;
(2) That the defendant acted with knowledge that the motor vehicle had been stolen;
(3) That the defendant withheld or appropriated the motor vehicle to the use of someone other than the true owner or person entitled thereto; and
(4) That any of these acts occurred in the State of Washington.
If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.
On the other hand, if, after weighing all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to any one of these elements, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.
NOTE ON USE
With this instruction use WPIC 2.25 (Vehicle—Nontraffic Cases—Definition), WPIC 10.02 (Knowledge—Knowingly—Definition), and WPIC 79.08 (Stolen—Definition).
For a discussion of the phrase “any of these acts” in element (4), see WPIC 4.20 (Introduction) and the Note on Use to WPIC 4.21 (Elements of the Crime—Form).
If the facts on which jurisdiction is based are in dispute, a special verdict form may need to be submitted to the jury. See WPIC 4.20 (Introduction).
COMMENT
RCW 9A.56.068; 9A.56.140.
Possession. The instruction incorporates the definition of “possessing stolen property” from RCW 9A.56.140. Although the Legislature did not expressly incorporate this definition into the crime of possession of stolen motor vehicle (compare with RCW 9A.56.310, which expressly incorporates this definition into possession of a stolen firearm), the Legislature must have intended this definition to apply. This definition applies to the other crimes relating to possessing stolen property in RCW Chapter 9A.56, and the definition is the source of the mens rea element for all these possession offenses. If the definition did not apply, the Legislature would have created a strict liability offense for simple possession.
To convict a person of possession of stolen property, the State is required to prove both 1) actual or constructive possession of the property that has been stolen, and 2) actual or constructive knowledge that the property has been stolen. State v. Plank, 46 Wn.App. 728, 731 P.2d 1170 (1987); State v. Summers, 45 Wn.App. 761, 728 P.2d 613 (1986); State v. Jennings, 35 Wn.App. 216, 666 P.2d 381 (1983). Constructive possession in possession of stolen property cases has the same meaning as it has in controlled substance cases—that the person has dominion and control over the goods. See State v. Plank, 46 Wn.App. at 731–33 (treating the definition from controlled substances cases as applying to stolen property cases). For a more detailed discussion of constructive possession in the context of possession of a controlled substance, see the Comment to WPIC 50.03 (Possession—Definition). For a discussion of actual and constructive knowledge as it applies to possession of stolen property, see Fine, 13B Washington Practice, Criminal Law and Sentencing section 31:13 (3d ed.).
In State v. Lakotiy, 151 Wn.App. 699, 214 P.3d 181 (2009), evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle based on constructive possession. The defendant was standing next to a stolen car in a small storage unit, the car had been partially disassembled and the ignition removed, several parts of the car were on the ground next to the car, another individual in the storage unit was working on the car, and when defendant saw police officers, he reached back and placed a set of jiggler keys and an ignition on the rear of the car.
Inclusion of disjunctive means of possessing stolen property (i.e. “received, possessed, concealed or disposed of”) in the elements instruction does not transform them into alternative means of commission of the crime. State v. Tyler, 191 Wn.2d 205, 422 P.3d 436 (2018); State v. Makekau, 194 Wn.App 407, 378 P.3d 577 (2016).
Instruction. Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction providing that a motor vehicle was a “vehicle that is self-propelled,” in prosecution for possessing a stolen motor vehicle; the State had to prove that defendant possessed a vehicle that was designed for self-propulsion. State v. Acevedo, 159 Wn.App. 221, 248 P.3d 526 (2010).
A riding lawnmower is not a motor vehicle under RCW 9A.56.065. State v. Barnes, 189 Wn.2d 492, 403 P.3d 72 (2017).
[Current as of January 2019.]
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