WPIC 10.00 Introduction—Statutory Levels of Culpability

Since 1975, a Washington statute has defined four culpable mental states: intent, knowledge, recklessness, and criminal negligence. RCW 9A.08.010(1) (adapting definitions, with some changes, from the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code). These statutory definitions apply to all criminal offenses, whether or not the offense is defined within RCW Title 9A, unless a statute specifically provides otherwise. See RCW 9A.04.090. Because the statute's definitions were adapted, with some changes, from the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, care should be taken in using Washington's case law that pre-dates the 1975 statutory enactment.

The statute creates a hierarchy of mental states, with intent representing the highest (most culpable) mental state and criminal negligence representing the lowest (least culpable). See State v. Shipp, 93 Wn.2d 510, 515, 610 P.2d 1322 (1980). Within this hierarchy, “proof of a higher mental state is necessarily proof of a lower mental state.” State v. Acosta, 101 Wn.2d 612, 618, 683 P.2d 1069 (1984); see RCW 9A.08.010(2). For example, proof of intent necessarily establishes knowledge. City of Spokane v. White, 102 Wn.App. 955, 10 P.3d 1095 (2000); RCW 9A.04.010(2).

The statute refers to a fifth mental state, willfulness. See WPIC 10.05 (Willfully—Definition). The statute does not define this mental state other than to indicate, as a general rule, that a requirement of willfulness is satisfied if the person acts knowingly, RCW 9A.08.010(4). This general rule does not apply if another statute specifically provides otherwise. See RCW 9A.04.090 and the Comment for WPIC 10.05 (Willfully—Definition).

In 2009, RCW 9A.08.010 was amended to make it gender-neutral. No substantive changes were made.

More detailed discussions of each of these mental states can be found in the various Comments contained in this chapter.