WPIC 120.02.01 Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer—Willfully—Definition

Use this instruction with WPIC 120.02 (Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer—Elements).

The statute on obstructing a law enforcement officer, RCW 9A.76.020, formerly required that the defendant “knowingly” hinder, obstruct, or delay a public servant in the discharge of his or her public duties. In 1985, Division I of the Court of Appeals observed in passing that the obstruction statute required “that the action or inaction be done knowingly by the obstructor, i.e., with intent to hinder.” State v. CLR, 40 Wn.App. 839, 842, 700 P.2d 1195 (1985). Five years later the same division declined to follow this statement, stating categorically that “intent to hinder, delay or obstruct is not a statutory element of the crime.” State v. Hudson, 56 Wn.App. 490, 496, 784 P.2d 533 (1990).

In 1994 the Legislature changed “knowingly” to “willfully.” According to RCW 9A.08.010(4), “[a] requirement that an offense be committed willfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements plainly appears.” See WPIC 10.05 (Willfully—Definition). In light of the change in the statutory wording, it appears that some additional requirement is contemplated. The question is what that additional requirement should be. In the escape context, willful has come to be equated with an intent requirement. See WPIC 120.39 (Willfully—Definition—Escape Cases). It has been noted, however, that

State v. Hall, 104 Wn.2d 486, 495, 706 P.2d 1074 (1985) (Justice Durham, dissenting) (quoting State v. Oyen, 78 Wn.2d 909, 916, 480 P.2d 766 (1971)), vacated on other grounds, Oyen v. Wash., 408 U.S. 933, S.Ct. 2846, 33 L.Ed.2d 745 (1972). The definition in WPIC 120.02.01 is based on this previously accepted meaning of the term.