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WPI 343.06 Conditions of Confinement—Eighth Amendment—Deliberate Indifference—Failure to Protec...

6A WAPRAC WPI 343.06Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil

6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 343.06 (7th ed.)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
April 2022 Update
Washington State Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions
Part XVII. Civil Rights
Chapter 343. Civil Rights—Conditions of Confinement
WPI 343.06 Conditions of Confinement—Eighth Amendment—Deliberate Indifference—Failure to Protect
“Deliberate indifference,” as used in these instructions, means:
(1) The defendant was aware of a substantial risk that the plaintiff would be seriously harmed, and
(2) The defendant consciously failed or refused to take reasonable steps to address the substantial risk of serious harm.
Negligence or inadvertence alone does not constitute deliberate indifference.
Mere suspicion of a substantial risk of serious harm is not enough to prove that the defendant was aware of such risk. On the other hand, the plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant believed it was absolutely certain that the specific type of serious harm was going to occur at a given place and a certain time in order to prove that defendant was aware of such risk.
[In your determination of whether any steps taken by the [prison] [jail] officials were reasonable, you may consider: whether the [prison] [jail] official(s) considered safety to other inmates, whether the [prison] [jail] official(s) took measures to protect the plaintiff, and whether there were any less dangerous alternative arrangements available] [and] [other circumstances relevant to the question of reasonableness].
NOTE ON USE
Use this instruction as the definition for deliberate indifference for an Eighth Amendment claim that the defendant failed to address a significant risk of serious harm to plaintiff from a dangerous condition of confinement while the plaintiff was in custody after conviction.
Use this instruction with WPI 340.01 (Claims Instruction for Section 1983 Cases); WPI 340.03 (Civil Rights—“Under Color of Law”—Definition); WPI 340.04 (Civil Rights—“Subjects” and “Causes to be Subjected”—Definition); WPI 343.05 (Conditions of Custody—Eighth Amendment—Failure to Protect—Burden of Proof on the Issues). Use the bracketed language as applicable.
Do not use WPI 341.04 (Civil Rights—Failure to Train or Inadequate Training—Municipal Liability—Deliberate Indifference—Definition) as the definition of deliberate indifference, unless there is an issue about failure to train or inadequate training, in the context of a cause of action against municipal defendant or other local government defendant.
For general conditions of confinement claims brought under the Eighth Amendment, use WPI 343.02 (Conditions of Confinement—Eighth Amendment—Deliberate Indifference—General Conditions of Confinement) instead of this instruction.
For medical claims brought under the Eighth Amendment, use WPI 343.04 (Conditions of Confinement—Eighth Amendment—Deliberate Indifference—Medical) instead of this instruction.
COMMENT
Prior to this edition, this instruction was designated as WPI 343.04. This instruction now applies only to claims under the Eighth Amendment.
See the Comment to WPI 343.00 (Introduction—Conditions of Confinement—Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment) for a discussion of this and other Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claims.
The instruction is based on: Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–38, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33–36, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303–06, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271(1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049–52 (9th Cir. 2002); Robinson v. Prunty, 249 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2001); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991); and Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459–62 (9th Cir. 1986).
[Current as of September 2018.]
End of Document