WPI 343.04 Conditions of Confinement—Eighth Amendment—Deliberate Indifference—Medical

Use this instruction for an Eighth Amendment claim that defendant failed to meet the serious medical needs of plaintiff while plaintiff was in custody serving a sentence.

See the Comment to WPI 343.00 (Introduction—Conditions of Confinement/Medical Care—Eighth Amendment) regarding whether to use or modify this instruction for a medical care claim brought by a pretrial detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Use this instruction with WPI 340.01 (Claims Instruction for Section 1983 Cases), WPI 340.03 (Civil Rights—“Under Color of Law”—Definition), WPI 340.04 (Civil Rights—“Subjects” and “Causes to be Subjected”—Definition), and WPI 343.03 (Conditions of Confinement—Medical Care—Eighth Amendment—Burden of Proof on the Issues).

Do not use WPI 341.04 (Civil Rights—Failure to Train or Inadequate Training—Municipal Liability—“Deliberate Indifference”—Definition) as the definition of deliberate indifference, unless there is an issue about failure to train or inadequate training in the context of a cause of action against municipal defendant or other local government defendant.

For the definition of deliberate indifference in a general conditions of confinement claims brought under the Eighth Amendment, use WPI 343.02 (Conditions of Confinement—Eighth Amendment—Deliberate Indifference—General Conditions of Confinement) instead of this instruction.

For the definition of deliberate indifference in a failure to protect claims brought under the Eighth Amendment, use WPI 343.06 (Conditions of Confinement—Eighth Amendment—Deliberate Indifference—Failure to Protect) instead of this instruction.

Prior to this edition, this instruction was designated as WPI 343.02. This instruction now applies only to claims under the Eighth Amendment.

See the Comment to WPI 343.00 (Introduction—Conditions of Confinement—Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment) for a discussion of this and other Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claims.

The instruction is based on Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–38, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303–06, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991), and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). See also Ninth Cir. Civ. Jury Instr. 9.27 (2007); Comment, Eighth Cir. Civ. Jury Instr. 4.43 (last updated 2017).

Serious medical need. Although the Washington Supreme Court has not defined “serious medical need,” the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized that a serious medical need is “[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A “serious” medical need is not confined to a horrific situation involving pain that is tantamount to “physical torture or a lingering death.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).

If the injury or illness would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and pointless infliction of pain if not treated, it is serious. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), overruled on other grounds in WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d at 1135–36; Hunt v. Dental Dep't, 865 F.2d 198, 200–01 (9th Cir. 1989); see also, Comment, Eighth Cir. Civ. Jury Instr. 4.43 (last updated 2017) (suggesting that serious medical need should be defined for the jury); see also Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Busby, 953 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1991); Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 473–74 (3rd Cir. 1987).