WPI 70.03.03 Duty of a Pedestrian Before Entering a Crosswalk

Use this instruction with WPI 70.03 (Right of Way of a Pedestrian Within a Crosswalk), as applicable. Use WPI 11.01 (Contributory Negligence—Definition) and WPI 11.07 (Determining the Degree of Contributory Negligence) with this instruction as applicable.

Use WPI 60.03 (Violation of Statute, Ordinance, Administrative Rule, or Internal Governmental Policy—Evidence of Negligence) with this instruction.

Use bracketed material as applicable.

A definition of Personal delivery device may be crafted if it will be helpful for the jury. See the Comment to WPI 70.02.04 (Right of Way—Emerging from Alley, Driveway, or Building in Business or Residence District).

This instruction was amended for this edition, and is based in part on RCW 46.61.235(2) and in part on Burnham v. Nehren, 7 Wn.App. 860, 503 P.2d 122 (1972). Burnham details the duties of a pedestrian in approaching and entering a crosswalk. See also Beireis v. Leslie, 35 Wn.2d 554, 214 P.2d 194 (1950); Farrow v. Ostrom, 10 Wn.2d 666, 117 P.2d 963 (1941) (the question of whether or not a pedestrian exercised reasonable care in observing traffic conditions before entering a crosswalk is one of fact for the jury); Alston v. Blythe, 86 Wn.App. 26, 943 P.2d 692 (1997).

RCW 46.61.235(2) was amended to include a “personal delivery device” as a protected entity under this crosswalk provision:

Laws of 2019, Chapter 214, § 12. An additional definition of personal delivery device may be useful. RCW 46.61.733 and 46.75.010(4). See discussion in the Comment to WPI 70.02.04 (Right of Way—Emerging from Alley, Driveway, or Building in Business or Residence District) and the Comment to WPI 70.03.03 (Duty of a Pedestrian Before Entering a Crosswalk).

Care should be taken when looking at cases decided before the enactment of the Tort Reform Act, RCW 5.40.050 in 1986. Earlier cases held that the failure of a pedestrian to look for oncoming vehicles from a place of safety before entering a crosswalk constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law. See, e.g., Iwata v. Champine, 74 Wn.2d 844, 447 P.2d 175 (1968); Hamblet v. Soderburg, 189 Wash. 449, 65 P.2d 1267 (1937). However, RCW 5.40.050, enacted in 1986, modifies these cases and abrogates the doctrine of negligence per se in most instances. The statute provides that evidence of a statutory violation may be considered as evidence of negligence. See WPI 60.03 (Violation of a Statute, Ordinance, Administrative Rule, or Internal Governmental Policy—Evidence of Negligence).

Poor visibility due to weather conditions does not lessen the protection of a crosswalk unless a pedestrian suddenly leaves a place of safety or walks or runs into path of a vehicle so close as to make it impossible for the driver to yield. Oberlander v. Cox, 75 Wn.2d 189, 449 P.2d 388 (1969).