WPI70.03.03Duty of a Pedestrian Before Entering a Crosswalk
6 WAPRAC WPI 70.03.03Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
6 Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 70.03.03 (7th ed.)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
July 2019 Update
Part VIII. Motor Vehicles
Chapter 70. Motor Vehicles
WPI 70.03.03 Duty of a Pedestrian Before Entering a Crosswalk
Before entering a crosswalk, a pedestrian has a duty to look for approaching vehicles. A statute provides that no pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk, run, or otherwise move into the path of a vehicle that is so close that it is impossible for the driver to stop.
NOTE ON USE
Use this instruction with WPI 70.03 (Right of Way of a Pedestrian Within a Crosswalk), as applicable. Use WPI 11.01 (Contributory Negligence—Definition), and WPI 11.07 (Determining the Degree of Contributory Negligence), with this instruction as applicable.
Use WPI 60.03 (Violation of Statute, Ordinance, Administrative Rule, or Internal Governmental Policy—Evidence of Negligence) with this instruction.
This instruction is based in part on RCW 46.61.235(2) and in part on Burnham v. Nehren, 7 Wn.App. 860, 503 P.2d 122 (1972), which addresses in detail the duties of a pedestrian in approaching and entering a crosswalk. See also Beireis v. Leslie, 35 Wn.2d 554, 214 P.2d 194 (1950); Farrow v. Ostrom, 10 Wn.2d 666, 117 P.2d 963 (1941) (the question of whether or not a pedestrian exercised reasonable care in observing traffic conditions before entering a crosswalk is one of fact for the jury); Alston v. Blythe, 86 Wn.App. 26, 943 P.2d 692 (1997).
RCW 46.61.235(2) provides:
No pedestrian or bicycle shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk, run, or otherwise move into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for the driver to stop.
Care should be taken when looking at cases decided before the enactment of RCW 5.40.050 in 1986. Earlier cases held that the failure of a pedestrian to look for oncoming vehicles from a place of safety before entering a crosswalk constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law. See, e.g., Iwata v. Champine, 74 Wn.2d 844, 447 P.2d 175 (1968); Hamblet v. Soderburg, 189 Wash. 449, 65 P.2d 1267 (1937). However, RCW 5.40.050, enacted in 1986, modifies these cases and abrogates the doctrine of negligence per se in most instances. The statute provides that evidence of a statutory violation may be considered as evidence of negligence. See WPI 60.03 (Violation of a Statute, Ordinance, Administrative Rule, or Internal Governmental Policy—Evidence of Negligence).
Poor visibility due to weather conditions does not lessen the protection of a crosswalk unless a pedestrian suddenly leaves a place of safety or walks or runs into path of a vehicle so close as to make it impossible for the driver to yield. Oberlander v. Cox, 75 Wn.2d 189, 449 P.2d 388 (1969).
[Current as of September 2018.]
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