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WPI 70.03.02 Driver Approaching a Crosswalk—Duty to Stop

6 WAPRAC WPI 70.03.02Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil

6 Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 70.03.02 (7th ed.)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
April 2022 Update
Washington State Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions
Part VIII. Motor Vehicles
Chapter 70. Motor Vehicles
WPI 70.03.02 Driver Approaching a Crosswalk—Duty to Stop
A statute provides that the driver of an approaching vehicle shall stop and remain stopped to allow a [[pedestrian] [bicycle] [personal delivery device]] to cross the roadway within a crosswalk when the [[pedestrian] [bicycle] [personal delivery device]] is [upon the roadway on which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning] [either upon, or within one lane of, the half of the roadway on which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning].
NOTE ON USE
Use this instruction in all cases involving a driver approaching a crosswalk, whether marked or unmarked. As applicable, use WPI 70.03.01 (Driver Approaching a Crosswalk—Duty to Observe) with this instruction.
Use the first bracketed phrase of this instruction when the pedestrian was upon the roadway of either a two-lane street or a one-way street regardless of the number of lanes of the one-way street. Use the second bracketed phrase when the pedestrian was upon the roadway of road with two-way traffic having more than two lanes. Use other bracketed phrases as applicable. See Comment below.
Use this instruction with WPI 70.03 (Right of Way of a Pedestrian Within a Crosswalk), as applicable.
Use this instruction with the appropriate definition from WPI 70.03.05 (Crosswalk—Definition) if there is an issue as to whether or not a pedestrian was in a crosswalk.
Use WPI 60.03 (Violation of Statute, Ordinance, Administrative Rule, or Internal Governmental Policy—Evidence of Negligence) with this instruction.
A definition of Personal delivery device may be crafted if it will be helpful for the jury. See the Comment to WPI 70.02.04 (Right of Way—Emerging from Alley, Driveway, or Building in Business or Residence District).
COMMENT
RCW 46.61.235(1). This statute was amended to include a “personal delivery device” among the entities protected. Laws of 2019, Chapter 214, § 12. The revised instruction follows the statutory language.
An additional definition of personal delivery device may be useful. RCW 46.61.733 and 46.75.010(4). See discussion in the Comment to WPI 70.02.04 (Right of Way—Emerging from Alley, Driveway, or Building in Business or Residence District) and the Comment to WPI 70.03.03 (Duty of a Pedestrian Before Entering a Crosswalk).
The first bracketed phrases of this instruction are based on the two duties established by the statute dependent on facts. A motorist must stop for any pedestrian in a crosswalk of either a two-lane road or any one-way road regardless of the number of lanes when the pedestrian is upon the roadway on which the motorist is traveling or onto which the motorist is turning. In addition, a motorist must stop for any pedestrian in a crosswalk of a road with two-way traffic consisting of more than two lanes when the pedestrian is either upon, or within one lane of, the half of the roadway on which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning.
Care should be taken when looking at cases decided before the enactment of the Tort Reform Act, RCW 5.40.050 in 1986. For example, in Daley v. Stephens, 64 Wn.2d 806, 394 P.2d 801 (1964), the court held that a driver is negligent as a matter of law if he or she fails to yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian in a crosswalk in the absence of evidence of unusual circumstances. However, RCW 5.40.050, enacted in 1986, modifies Daley. The statute abrogates the doctrine of negligence per se in most instances and provides that evidence of a statutory violation may be considered as evidence of negligence. See WPI 60.03 (Violation of a Statute, Ordinance, Administrative Rule, or Internal Governmental Policy—Evidence of Negligence).
[Current as of February 2021.]
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