WPI 365.11 Sexually Violent Predators—Reasonable Doubt—Definition
6A WAPRAC WPI 365.11Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 365.11 (7th ed.)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
April 2022 Update
Part XIX. Involuntary Treatment
Chapter 365. Involuntary Treatment—Sexually Violent Predators
WPI 365.11 Sexually Violent Predators—Reasonable Doubt—Definition
The State has filed a petition alleging that(fill in name of respondent)is a sexually violent predator. As the petitioner, the State has the burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no burden on(fill in name of respondent)to establish the existence of a reasonable doubt.
A reasonable doubt is one for which a reason exists and may arise from the evidence or lack of evidence. It is such a doubt as would exist in the mind of a reasonable person after fully, fairly, and carefully considering all of the evidence or lack of evidence. [If, from such consideration, you have an abiding belief in the truth of the allegations, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.]
NOTE ON USE
Use the unbracketed language in every case. For a discussion of the bracketed sentence on abiding belief, see the Comment to WPIC 4.01 (Burden of Proof—Presumption of Innocence—Reasonable Doubt).
COMMENT
The pattern instruction follows the general approach of the criminal pattern instruction that defines reasonable doubt, WPIC 4.01 (Burden of Proof—Presumption of Innocence—Reasonable Doubt). For further discussion of issues related to defining reasonable doubt, see the Comment to WPIC 4.01 (Burden of Proof—Presumption of Innocence—Reasonable Doubt).
RCW 71.09.060 requires the State to prove that the respondent is a sexually violent predator beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the jury must be unanimous before a verdict can be returned. RCW 71.09.060(1); In re Detention of Young, 122 Wn.2d 1, 48, 857 P.2d 989 (1993) (interpreting a prior version of the statute). However, a commitment under RCW Chapter 71.09 is civil in nature and the respondent is not afforded criminal protections “beyond those supplied in the statute and those granted in Young.” In re Detention of Twining, 77 Wn.App. 882, 895, 894 P.2d 1331 (1995) (no error to decline to instruct that the respondent is presumed not to be a sexually violent predator), overruled on other grounds by In re Detention of Pouncy, 168 Wn.2d 382, 229 P.3d 678 (2010).
The Washington Sexually Violent Predator Act has been upheld against a challenge that its real impact is punitive and that a commitment pursuant to the SVPA subjects a respondent to double jeopardy. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001).
The Washington State Supreme Court, in the criminal context, has required the use of WPIC 4.01 (Burden of Proof—Presumption of Innocence—Reasonable Doubt) and has rejected attempts to formulate alternative definitions of reasonable doubt. State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303, 307–18, 165 P.3d 1241 (2007). The reasoning of Bennett is equally applicable to proceedings under RCW Chapter 71.09.
It is error to fail to define the phrase “reasonable doubt.” State v. McHenry, 88 Wn.2d 211, 214, 558 P.2d 188 (1977).
[Current as of October 2020.]
Westlaw. © 2022 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
| End of Document |