WPI 340.04 Civil Rights—“Subjects” and “Causes to Be Subjected”—Definition
6A WAPRAC WPI 340.04Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 340.04 (7th ed.)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
April 2022 Update
Part XVII. Civil Rights
Chapter 340. Civil Rights—General Introductory Instructions
WPI 340.04 Civil Rights—“Subjects” and “Causes to Be Subjected”—Definition
[A person subjects another to the deprivation of a [constitutional] [statutory] right, within the meaning of Section 1983, if [he] [she] does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or does not perform an act which [he] [she] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation.]
[A person causes another to be subjected to the deprivation of a [constitutional] [statutory] right, within the meaning of Section 1983, by direct personal participation in the deprivation, or by setting in motion a series of acts by others [or] [by failing to stop the acts of others,] [or by failing to investigate the acts of others], which the person knows or reasonably should know would cause others to violate the [constitutional] [statutory] right.]
NOTE ON USE
Use in Section 1983 cases against an individual defendant. Use the bracketed language as appropriate.
COMMENT
This instruction is taken from the language of Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743–44 (9th Cir. 1978).
A defendant may be liable for culpable inaction, as well as action. Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2009). In certain cases, additional instructions may be needed to clarify for the jury how a person could “cause another to be subjected” by failing to stop another person's activity, or by failing to investigate the activities of another person, or other such inaction—especially in a case involving a written policy that proscribes particular conduct by employees. See Hunter v. County of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2011).
A defendant is liable “not only for conduct that directly violates a right but for conduct that is the effective cause of another's direct infliction of the constitutional injury.” Sales v. Grant, 158 F.3d 768, 776 (4th Cir. 1998). Under this standard, a defendant becomes individually liable by “setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Lakeside-Scott v. Multnomah County, 556 F.3d 797, 804–05 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Sales v. Grant, 158 F.3d at 776; Citoli v. City of Seattle, 115 Wn.App. 459, 487–88, 61 P.3d 1165 (2002). Compare the requirements for municipal liability, or the liability of a defendant in his or her official capacity, WPI Chapter 341 (Civil Rights—Municipal and Local Government Liability).
For further discussion of causation issues, see WPI 340.06 (Civil Rights—Causation—Comment Only).
[Current as of September 2018.]
Westlaw. © 2022 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
| End of Document |