WPI 302.10 Excuse of Performance—Frustration of Purpose
6A WAPRAC WPI 302.10Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 302.10 (7th ed.)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
April 2022 Update
Part XIII. Contracts
Chapter 302. Contracts—Performance and Breach
WPI 302.10 Excuse of Performance—Frustration of Purpose
A party's remaining duties of performance under a contract are excused if the party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated, without that party's fault, by the occurrence of an unforeseen event when the non-occurrence of such an event was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.
In this case,(name of party)is relieved of the duty to(set forth performance claimed to be excused)if(name of party)proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [his] [her] [its] principal purpose in entering into the contract was substantially frustrated, without(name of party)'s fault, by the occurrence of an unforeseen event and that the lack or absence of such occurrence was a basic assumption, by [both] [all] contracting parties, on which the contract was made.
NOTE ON USE
Use this instruction after an initial determination by the court that the evidence and circumstances would warrant a finding of frustration of purpose under Washington law.
Use this instruction with WPI 21.01 (Meaning of Burden of Proof—Preponderance of the Evidence).
COMMENT
Although application of the doctrine of frustration of purpose is a question of law, see Felt v. McCarthy, 130 Wn.2d 203, 207, 922 P.2d 90 (1996), the jury may still need to resolve related factual disputes. For further discussion, see the Comment to WPI 302.09 (Excuse of Performance—Impossibility or Impracticability).
Washington courts have adopted Restatement (Second) of Contracts: Discharge by Supervening Frustration § 265 (1981). Felt, 130 Wn.2d at 207; Wash. State Hop Producers, Inc. Liquidation Trust v. Goschie Farms, Inc., 112 Wn.2d 694, 773 P.2d 70 (1989). Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 265 (1981) provides that:
The instruction uses the term excused, rather than discharged, because it would be more familiar to jurors.
The doctrine requires more than the unforeseeability of the frustrating event; the assumption that a desired objective was possible must “be so completely the basis of the contract that, as both parties understand, without it the transaction would make little sense.” Felt, 78 Wn.App. at 367 (emphasis added) (citing Weyerhaeuser Real Est. Co. v. Stoneway Concrete, Inc., 96 Wn.2d 558, 637 P.2d 647 (1981)), affirmed, 130 Wn.2d 203, 208–09, 922 P.2d 90 (1996). The doctrine does not apply if the contract discloses an allocation of the risk to one party or the other. Scott v. Petett, 63 Wn.App. 50, 60, 816 P.2d 1229 (1991).
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 266(2), the principle also applies to facts existing at the time of contracting, of which the party had no reason to know:
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 266(2) (1981). Compare WPI 301.08 (Enforceability—Mutual Mistake) and WPI 301.09 (Enforceability—Unilateral Mistake).
[Current as of April 2021.]
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