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WPI 151.01 Access, Light, View, and Air—Abutting Public Way

6A WAPRAC WPI 151.01Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil

6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 151.01 (7th ed.)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
April 2022 Update
Washington State Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions
Part X-A. Eminent Domain
Chapter 151. Eminent Domain—Special Instructions
WPI 151.01 Access, Light, View, and Air—Abutting Public Way
Owners of property abutting upon an existing public way have rights of [access] [light] [view] [and] [air] to and from such public way.
[The right of access means that an owner is entitled to reasonable ingress and egress to the property. However, an owner is not necessarily entitled to access at all points along the boundary between the property and the existing public way.]
[Unless such rights of [access] [light] [view] [and] [air] are substantially impaired, such owner has suffered no compensable damage in regard to these rights.]
NOTE ON USE
Use this instruction when property rights taken or damaged include the rights of access, light, view, or air of an owner whose property abuts an existing public way.
Use bracketed material as applicable. If only one of the four bracketed rights is at issue, then the instruction will need to be slightly modified.
COMMENT
In general. RCW 47.52.040 through.050 apply to limited access highways and address the rights covered in this instruction. These rights are governed not only by statutes, but also by independent judicial doctrine. See Fry v. O'Leary, 141 Wash. 465, 252 P. 111, 49 A.L.R. 1249 (1927) (addressing the rights of access, light, air, and view without discussing any statutes). For further discussion of the rights addressed in this instruction, see State v. Fox, 53 Wn.2d 216, 332 P.2d 943 (1958); State v. Kodama, 4 Wn.App. 676, 483 P.2d 857 (1971); Fry v. O'Leary, 141 Wash. 465. These rights are confined to existing public ways. State v. Calkins, 50 Wn.2d 716, 314 P.2d 449 (1957).
Right of access. On the reasonableness of access and restrictions of access, see TT Properties v. City of Tacoma, 192 Wn.App. 238, 366 P.3d 465 (2016) (abutting owner has the right of access to the property but not to a particular street); also see Pande Cameron & Co. of Seattle, Inc. v. Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority, 610 F.Supp.2d 1288 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (no authority under Washington law for a temporary “right of access” or a temporary “right to light, air, and view” takings claim); Kieffer v. King County, 89 Wn.2d 369, 572 P.2d 408 (1977) (whether there is a “substantial” impairment of access is a question of fact); State v. Williams, 64 Wn.2d 842, 394 P.2d 693 (1964); Lenci v. City of Seattle, 63 Wn.2d 664, 388 P.2d 926 (1964); Denman v. City of Tacoma, 148 Wash. 314, 268 P. 1043 (1928); Union Elevator & Warehouse Co., Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 96 Wn.App. 288, 980 P.2d 779 (1999). Cf. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wn.2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964).
Right of view. An owner of property abutting an existing public way has a compensable right of view. Fry v. O'Leary, 141 Wash. 465, 468–70, 252 P. 111, 49 A.L.R. 1249 (1927). In other contexts, however, the taking of an owner's view may not be compensable. Taft v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank, 127 Wash. 503, 221 P. 604 (1923). Inverse condemnation actions may not be maintained for loss of view unless an easement, covenant, statute, or some other source grants an affirmative right of view. Pierce v. Northeast Lake Washington Sewer and Water Dist., 123 Wn.2d 550, 870 P.2d 305 (1994). On the general nature of the right of view, see Housing Authority of City of Seattle v. Brown, 68 Wn.2d 485, 413 P.2d 635 (1966).
[Current as of October 2016.]
End of Document