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WPI150.05Measure of Compensation—Total Taking

6A WAPRAC WPI 150.05Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil

6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 150.05 (7th ed.)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
July 2019 Update
Washington State Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions
Part X-A. Eminent Domain
Chapter 150. Eminent Domain—General Instructions
WPI 150.05 Measure of Compensation—Total Taking
Just compensation means the fair market value of the property. You are to consider, as part of the property, such improvements as have become permanently attached to the property and that affect its value. The fair market value is measured as of [(insert actual date of trial)] [(insert actual date of possession and use/agreed date of value)]. You are not to consider any reduction or increase in the fair market value of the property caused by(name of agency's)project.
NOTE ON USE
Use this instruction when total ownership is being acquired. For cases involving partial takings, instead use WPI 150.06 (Measure of Compensation—Partial Taking) or WPI 150.07 (Measure of Compensation—Partial Taking—Benefits).
Use the date of trial to measure fair market value if possession and use of the property has not been granted to petitioner prior to trial. If an order has previously been entered granting immediate possession and use of the property to petitioner prior to the date of trial or the date of value is otherwise not in dispute, insert the relevant date.
COMMENT
Market value. The market value of the property is the usual basis for compensation in a condemnation proceeding. Phillips v. King County, 136 Wn.2d 946, 956–57, 968 P.2d 871 (1998) (inverse condemnation case); City of Medina v. Cook, 69 Wn.2d 574, 418 P.2d 1020 (1966).
Cases sometimes refer to fair “cash” market value, although the term has not been consistently applied to the Washington cases. State v. Roth, 78 Wn.2d 711, 479 P.2d 55 (1971); City of Spokane v. Williams, 157 Wash. 120, 288 P. 258 (1930); King County v. Crawford & Conover, 92 Wash. 195, 158 P. 733 (1916); and Seattle & M.R. Co. v. Roeder, 30 Wash. 244, 70 P. 498 (1902). The problems that require the inclusion or exclusion of the word “cash” are usually associated with the presentation of evidence rather than jury instructions, and sufficient emphasis is given by the reference to “in cash” in WPI 150.08 (Fair Market Value—Definition).
Date of valuation. The date of valuation will usually be the date of trial. State v. Williams, 68 Wn.2d 946, 416 P.2d 350 (1966). This is also true in an inverse condemnation case. Blankenship v. State, 160 Wash. 514, 295 P. 480 (1931). The general rule may be modified if using the trial date would be unfair under the facts of a particular case. Port of Seattle v. Equitable Capital Group, Inc., 127 Wn.2d 202, 898 P.2d 275 (1995) (affirming the trial court's use of the date on which the title passed to the condemnor) or if petitioner has obtained early possession and use of the property. See, generally Lange v. State, 86 Wn.2d 585, 590–93, 547 P.2d 282 (1976); Petition of City of Anacortes, 81 Wn.2d 166, 169, 500 P.2d 546 (1972); Consolidated Diking Imp. Dist. No. 3 v. Davis, 36 Wn.App. 125, 672 P.2d 414 (1983); State v. Buckley, 18 Wn.App. 798, 572 P.2d 730 (1977).
For condemnations by the State, see also RCW 8.04.092 (date of valuation is the date stated in the order granting possession and use, or if not stated, the date of entry of the order).
Impact of project not to be considered. The rule in Washington, as in most other jurisdictions, is that property taken in eminent domain must be valued without regard to the project for which it is taken. Washington's leading case is Pierce County v. Duffy, 104 Wash. 426, 176 P. 670 (1918).
Separate interests. In the usual case, the jury will return a lump sum verdict covering compensation for all persons owning an interest in the property as though all interests were owned by a single entity. See RCW 8.04.110. Under this approach, apportionment of the award among the several owners is handled by the judge at a subsequent proceeding not involving the condemnor. See RCW 8.04.140, 8.20.110; State v. Spencer, 90 Wn.2d 415, 583 P.2d 1201 (1978).
The timing of the apportionment, however, varies depending on the particular statutory scheme. For condemnation actions brought by the state, RCW Chapter 8.04 creates the two-step approach outlined above. RCW 8.04.110, 8.04.140; State v. Spencer, 90 Wn.2d at 418. Under these statutes, however, the judge may have discretion to forego the two-step approach and to instruct the jury to apportion the value among owners of different interests as part of their condemnation verdict. See State v. Higgins, 75 Wn.2d 110, 449 P.2d 393 (1969) (case involving leased lands).
Under separate statutes applying to other governmental entities, however, the jury hearing the condemnation action may return a verdict for each interest in the land. In this situation further instruction on the measure of compensation for each interest and modification of the verdict form will be required. See RCW 8.20.080 applying to corporations, and RCW 8.12.100, RCW 8.12.120, and RCW 8.12.150 applying to cities. The sections on city condemnations also apply to condemnation by public utility districts (RCW 54.16.020), hospital districts (RCW 70.44.060), water-sewer districts (RCW 57.08.005), park districts (RCW 53.08.010), regional transit authorities (RCW 81.112.080), port districts (RCW 53.08.010 and RCW 53.25.190), and metropolitan districts (RCW 35.58.320).
[Current as of October 2016.]
End of Document