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WPI 72.04 Joint Venture

6 WAPRAC WPI 72.04Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil

6 Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 72.04 (7th ed.)

Washington Practice Series TM

Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil

April 2022 Update

Washington State Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions

Part VIII. Motor Vehicles

Chapter 72. Guest-Passenger—Joint Venture—Family Car

WPI 72.04 Joint Venture

The [plaintiff] [defendant] is responsible for any negligence of the driver of the car in which the [plaintiff] [defendant] [(insert name of party)] was riding if you find that the [plaintiff] [defendant] and the driver were engaged in carrying out a common purpose, with a community of interest, in a joint enterprise of a business or other nonsocial nature entered into for material gain or profit, and that the driving was connected with that common purpose.

If you find that they were not so engaged, then any negligence that you may find on the part of the driver cannot be charged to the [plaintiff] [defendant].

NOTE ON USE

Use bracketed material as applicable.

This instruction relates to a plaintiff or a defendant who is a passenger, when the adverse party to the suit is someone other than the driver of the car, and the claim is that the passenger is charged with the negligence of the driver of the car. If the driver is also a plaintiff or a defendant on the same side of the suit as the passenger, this instruction will have to be tailored to refer only to the plaintiff or defendant who is a passenger and not to the driver. This is best accomplished by referring to the respective plaintiffs or defendants by their names.

This instruction is not to be used in a suit between a passenger and the driver of the car.

Do not use this instruction in transportation for hire cases. See Comment below. For a case involving a common carrier, see WPI Chapter 11 (Common Carriers).

COMMENT

The basis of imputing negligence in a joint venture situation is agency. “Even in auto cases, we have never departed from the basic law of agency that only he who controls or has the right to control shall be liable.” Poutre v. Saunders, 19 Wn.2d 561, 567, 143 P.2d 554 (1943). Most often the right of control is implied as a matter of law from the common purpose of the parties. That common purpose must relate to an undertaking of a business or nonsocial nature and must be found in something other than the transportation for hire itself. Poutre, 19 Wn.2d at 568–69.

A joint undertaking of a business nature, for material gain or profit, is such a partnership even though limited to a single transaction, as by the law of agency establishes the right of control.

Poutre, 19 Wn.2d at 568 (punctuation omitted).

Poutre also holds that such a joint venture can exist by virtue of an actual agreement to the effect that each shall have the right of control regardless of who is in actual control of the vehicle. Poutre, 19 Wn.2d at 555–56. The factual situation in which it is claimed that there is such an express agreement as to the right of control is so uncommon that no pattern instruction is proposed to cover it.

Joint ownership or joint possession of a vehicle may give rise to vicarious liability even though there is no joint venture. Combes v. Snow, 56 Wn.2d 122, 351 P.2d 419 (1960).

[Current as of March 2021.]

End of Document