WPI 70.05 Speed
6 WAPRAC WPI 70.05Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
6 Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 70.05 (7th ed.)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
April 2022 Update
Part VIII. Motor Vehicles
Chapter 70. Motor Vehicles
WPI 70.05 Speed
A statute provides that no person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions, having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. The driver shall control speed to avoid colliding with others who are complying with the law and using reasonable care.
[The statute provides that a driver shall drive at an appropriate reduced speed [when approaching and crossing an intersection] [when approaching and crossing a railway grade crossing] [when approaching and going around a curve] [when approaching a hill crest] [when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway] [when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic] [when special hazard exists by reason of weather or highway conditions.]]
[The maximum statutory speed limit at [(describe place (e.g., street, highway, mile marker, nearby intersection, etc.)] [the place here involved] was miles per hour.]
NOTE ON USE
Use bracketed material as applicable. The bracketed factors in the second paragraph should be used only when a specific factor is involved in the case.
In the third paragraph, the bracketed sentence on the maximum speed limit should be used only when appropriate. Insert a description of the incident location if that is agreed or use the bracketed phrase as appropriate.
Use WPI 60.03 (Violation of Statute, Ordinance, Administrative Rule, or Internal Governmental Policy—Evidence of Negligence) with this instruction.
COMMENT
RCW 46.61.400.
The factors to be considered under the statute and the proof needed to support a finding of excessive speed are discussed in Grobe v. Valley Garbage Service, Inc., 87 Wn.2d 217, 551 P.2d 748 (1976). The speed instruction is properly refused when excessive speed is not a proximate cause or if a conclusion of speed is merely speculation. Chhuth v. George, 43 Wn.App. 640, 719 P.2d 562 (1986).
For a detailed discussion of when a favored driver's speed constitutes a proximate cause, see Channel v. Mills, 77 Wn.App. 268, 890 P.2d 535 (1995); see also Theonnes v. Hazen, 37 Wn.App. 644, 681 P.2d 1284 (1984).
In Mina v. Boise Cascade Corp., 37 Wn.App. 445, 681 P.2d 880 (1984), affirmed, 104 Wn.2d 696, 710 P.2d 184 (1985), the court held that the question whether the plaintiff was traveling at an unreasonably slow speed was properly presented to the jury under RCW 46.61.400.
Evidence of speed eight miles in excess of the posted speed limit on a dark and wet road by a driver unfamiliar with the area using low beams because of a mechanical problem supported the giving of the “speed for special hazard” instruction. Holmes v. Wallace, 84 Wn.App. 156, 163–64, 926 P.2d 339 (1996).
[Current as of February 2021.]
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