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WPI 50.02 Agent—Scope of Authority Defined

6 WAPRAC WPI 50.02Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil

6 Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 50.02 (7th ed.)

Washington Practice Series TM

Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil

April 2022 Update

Washington State Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions

Part VI. Agency and Partnership—Torts

Chapter 50. Agency and Partnership—Torts

WPI 50.02 Agent—Scope of Authority Defined

One of the issues for you to decide is whether(agent's name)was acting within the scope of authority.

An agent is acting within the scope of authority if the agent is performing duties that were expressly or impliedly assigned to the agent by the principal or that were expressly or impliedly required by the contract of employment. [Likewise, an agent is acting within the scope of authority if the agent is engaged in the furtherance of the principal's interests.]

NOTE ON USE

For the scope of this instruction, see WPI 50.00 (Introduction).

Use this instruction when there is an issue as to the scope of authority. Use WPI 50.03 (Act of Agent is Act of Principal) with this instruction.

Use the bracketed sentence when it would help the jury determine the proper scope of authority.

COMMENT

In 2011, the Washington Supreme Court stated this test for scope of authority is “well-settled.” Rahman v. State, 170 Wn.2d 810, 815, 246 P.3d 182 (2011). In McGrail v. Department of Labor and Industries, 190 Wash. 272, 277, 67 P.2d 851 (1937), the court held:

The test for determining whether an employee is, at a given time, in the course of his employment, is whether the employee was, at the time, engaged in the performance of the duties required of him by his contract of employment or by the specific direction of his employer, or, as sometimes stated, whether he was engaged at the time in the furtherance of the employer's interests.

See also Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wn.2d 457, 467, 716 P.2d 814 (1986); Bratton v. Calkins, 73 Wn.App. 492, 498, 870 P.2d 981 (1994).

It is the general rule that a principal may be held liable for the tortious acts of the agent if such acts are done within the scope of employment, although the principal may not know or approve of them. See Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union Local No. 25, 62 Wn.2d 461, 469, 383 P.2d 504 (1963). Whether acts are committed within the scope of employment is ordinarily a question for the jury. Gilliam v. Dep't of Social & Health Servs., 89 Wn.App. 569, 585, 950 P.2d 20 (1998) (citing WPI 50.02).

Vicarious liability does not extend to acts committed by an employee who is pursuing his or her own personal interests rather than the employer's, even if the acts were committed during the course of employment. See Niece v. Elmview Grp. Home, 131 Wn.2d 39, 48, 929 P.2d 420 (1997); Smith v. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr., 144 Wn.App. 537, 543, 184 P.3d 646 (2008); Thompson v. Everett Clinic, 71 Wn.App. 548, 553, 860 P.2d 1054 (1993).

If an employee was acting outside the scope of employment, although the employer may not be vicariously liable for the tortious acts, the employer may still be liable under other theories, such as negligent training or supervision of employees. See Anderson v. Soap Lake Sch. Dist., 191 Wn.2d 343, 360–66, 423 P.3d 197 (2018); Niece, 131 Wn.2d at 48; Thompson, 71 Wn.App. at 553.

[Current as of November 2021.]

End of Document