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WPI 31.01.01 Measure of Damages—Survival Action—Statutory Beneficiaries

6 WAPRAC WPI 31.01.01Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil

6 Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 31.01.01 (7th ed.)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
April 2022 Update
Washington State Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions
Part IV. Damages
Chapter 31. Damages—Wrongful Death and Survival Actions
WPI 31.01.01 Measure of Damages—Survival Action—Statutory Beneficiaries
It is the duty of the court to instruct you as to the measure of damages on the plaintiff's claim for personal losses suffered by(name of decedent). [By instructing you on damages, the court does not mean to suggest for which party your verdict should be rendered.
If your verdict is for the plaintiff, then] you must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate(name of decedent)'s estate for such damages as you find were proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant.
[If you find for the plaintiff] [your verdict must include the following undisputed items:
(insert undisputed items and amounts)
In addition] you should consider the following items:
[1. Economic damages:]
[(a)][1.] The health care and funeral expenses that were reasonably and necessarily incurred.
[(b)][2.] The net accumulations lost to [his] [her] estate. In determining the net accumulations, you should take into account(name of decedent)'s age, health, life expectancy, occupation, and habits of industry, responsibility, and thrift. You should also take into account(name of decedent)'s earning capacity, including [his] [her] actual earnings prior to death and the earnings that reasonably would have been expected to be earned by [him] [her] in the future, including any pension benefits. Further, you should take into account the amount you find that(name of decedent)reasonably would have consumed as personal expenses [or reasonably would have contributed to(names of beneficiaries)during [his] [her] lifetime] and deduct this from [his] [her] expected future earnings to determine the net accumulations.
[2. Noneconomic damages:]
The [pain,] [suffering,] [anxiety,] [emotional distress,] [humiliation,] [and] [fear] experienced by [him] [her] prior to [his] [her] death as a result of(describe event).
The burden of proving damages rests upon the plaintiff. It is for you to determine, based upon the evidence, whether any particular element has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
Your award must be based upon evidence and not upon speculation, guess, or conjecture.
The law has not furnished us with any fixed standards by which to measure noneconomic damages. With reference to these matters you must be governed by your own judgment, by the evidence in the case, and by these instructions.
NOTE ON USE
Use this instruction for survival actions (brought under RCW 4.20.046 or RCW 4.20.060) that involve statutory beneficiaries. For such actions, use this instruction in conjunction with the applicable instruction from this chapter on wrongful death damages. See WPI 31.02.01– 31.03.02.
For survival actions not involving statutory beneficiaries, use WPI 31.01.02 (Measure of Damages—Survival Action—No Statutory Beneficiaries) instead of this instruction.
Use bracketed material as applicable. If some of the bracketed phrases are deleted, practitioners may need to capitalize the first word that follows the deleted phrase.
Do not use the bracketed paragraph on noneconomic damages in cases involving instantaneous death. For further discussion of this issue, see the Comment below.
COMMENT
RCW 4.20.046 and RCW 4.20.060.
Along with the wrongful death statutes, the general and special survival statutes, RCW 4.20.046 and RCW 4.20.060, were amended effective July 28, 2019. The amendments are remedial and retroactive and apply “to all claims that are not time-barred, as well as any claims pending in any court on July 28, 2019.” Laws 2019, Chapter 159, § 6. Under the amended RCW 4.20.020, parents and siblings of the decedent are no longer required to demonstrate financial dependence on the decedent in order to potentially recover economic and non-economic damages. They also may recover if they do not reside in the United States. These changes to the beneficiary structure are incorporated into the amended RCW 4.20.046 and RCW 4.20.060. See Note on Use to WPI 31.03.02 (Measure of Damages—Wrongful Death—Action for Benefit of Parent, Brother, or Sister); see generally DeWolf & Allen, 16 Washington Practice, Tort Law and Practice §§ 7:2, 7:4 (5th ed.).
Survival statutes. The general survival statute, RCW 4.20.046, provides in relevant part that “[a]ll causes of action by a person … against another person … shall survive to the personal representatives of the former and against the personal representatives of the latter …” A 1993 amendment to the statute allows damages for “pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, or humiliation,” but only on behalf of the beneficiaries listed in RCW 4.20.020, and specifies that these damages may be recovered regardless of whether the death was caused by the injury forming the basis for the action. See RCW 4.20.046.
The special survival statute, RCW 4.20.060, provides in relevant part that “[n]o action for a personal injury to any person occasioning death shall abate … by reason of such death” if the decedent is survived by a statutory beneficiary (spouse, child, state registered domestic partner, dependent parent, or dependent sibling).
These survival statutes differ in several respects. The special survival statute applies only to personal injuries “occasioning death,” RCW 4.20.060, while the general survival statute applies whether or not the death was caused by the personal injury that forms the basis for the action. RCW 4.20.046.
Compensation awarded under the general survival statute, RCW 4.20.046, becomes an asset of the estate. When there are wrongful death beneficiaries, compensation for pre-death personal injuries, including medical and hospital expenses and pre-death pain, suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, humiliation, and fear are awarded to the statutory beneficiaries, in accordance with the intestate succession statute, RCW 11.04.015. See Wilson v. Grant, 162 Wn.App. 731, 258 P.3d 689 (2011); Parrish v. Jones, 44 Wn.App. 449, 722 P.2d 878 (1986).
Significance of statutory beneficiaries. For actions involving statutory beneficiaries, this pattern instruction sets out the applicable elements of damages, including both economic and noneconomic damages. By comparison, when there are no statutory beneficiaries, noneconomic damages are not available. RCW 4.20.046 (as amended in 2019, see above); RCW 4.20.060 (as amended in 2019, see above). For this reason, a separate pattern instruction has been drafted for survival actions not involving statutory beneficiaries. Compare this instruction with WPI 31.01.02 (Measure of Damages—Survival Action—No Statutory Beneficiaries).
Loss of enjoyment of life. In Otani v. Broudy, 151 Wn.2d 750, 760–62, 92 P.3d 192 (2004), the Supreme Court held that post-death damages for loss of enjoyment of life are not recoverable by a decedent's estate under Washington's survival statutes.
Instantaneous death. In cases involving instantaneous death, the plaintiff may not recover any damages for pain and suffering. Pain and suffering damages are available only if “measurable time” elapses between injury and death. Chapple v. Ganger, 851 F.Supp. 1481, 1486 (E.D.Wash. 1994) (citing Bingaman v. Grays Harbor Comm'ty Hosp., 103 Wn.2d 831, 837, 699 P.2d 1230 (1985)); Tait v. Wahl, 97 Wn.App. 765, 770–71, 987 P.2d 127 (1999).
Avoiding double recoveries. The causes of action for wrongful death and survival may overlap in a particular case. The same recovery may be allowed under more than one statute. Care must be taken to avoid allowing a double recovery. See, e.g., Hinzman v. Palmanteer, 81 Wn.2d 327, 501 P.2d 1228 (1972), disapproved of on other grounds, Wooldridge v. Woolett, 96 Wn.2d 659, 666–67, 638 P.2d 566 (1981) (regarding duplication of damages between the general survival statute and the “child injury or death” statute); Criscuola v. Andrews, 82 Wn.2d 68, 69–70, 507 P.2d 149 (1973) (regarding duplication of damages between the general survival statute and the wrongful death statute).
The court in Criscuola stated: “The problem of prospective double compensation where actions are brought under both survival and wrongful death actions is avoided if recovery under the survival action is limited to the prospective net accumulations of the deceased.” Criscuola, 82 Wn.2d at 70. The WPI Committee has addressed this issue from Criscuola by limiting the element of lost income to net accumulations.
[Current as of April 2021.]
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