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WPI 16.01 Felony—Defense

6 WAPRAC WPI 16.01Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil

6 Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 16.01 (7th ed.)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
April 2022 Update
Washington State Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions
Part II. Negligence—Risk—Misconduct—Proximate Cause
Chapter 16. Defenses
WPI 16.01 Felony—Defense
It is a defense to any [action] [claim] for damages that the person [injured] [killed] was then engaged in the commission of a felony, if the felony was a proximate cause of the [injury] [death].
NOTE ON USE
Do not use this instruction for an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Use this instruction with WPI 16.02 (Felony—Elements), WPI 21.08 (Burden of Proof—on the Issues—Felony Defense), and WPI 15.01 (Proximate Cause—Definition).
Use the bracketed material as applicable.
COMMENT
RCW 4.24.420.
The statute provides that:
It is a complete defense to any action for damages for personal injury or wrongful death that the person injured or killed was engaged in the commission of a felony at the time of the occurrence causing the injury or death and the felony was a proximate cause of the injury or death. However, nothing in this section shall affect a right of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec.1983.
The applicable quantum of proof to establish the commission of a felony in a civil case is a preponderance of the evidence. See Leavy, Taber, Schultz and Bergdahl v. Metropolitan Life Ins.Co., 20 Wn.App. 503, 507, 581 P.2d 167 (1978) (proof of a willful and unlawful killing under the slayer's statute need only be by the preponderance of the evidence); see also Cook v. Gisler, 20 Wn.App. 677, 582 P.2d 550 (1978).
It appears that a conviction for the felony involved is not required for the assertion of the defense. See Leavy, Taber, Schultz and Bergdahl v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 20 Wn.App. at 507 (criminal trial not necessary to show a willful and unlawful killing for purposes of the slayer's statute). Likewise, an acquittal on the felony charge would not appear to bar the assertion of this defense. See Young v. City of Seattle, 25 Wn.2d 888, 895, 172 P.2d 222 (1946) (acquittal on a charge of criminal negligence not a bar to a civil action for negligence on the very same evidence).
[Current as of September 2018.]
End of Document