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WPI 15.04 Negligence of Defendant Concurring With Other Causes

6 WAPRAC WPI 15.04Washington Practice Series TMWashington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil

6 Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 15.04 (7th ed.)
Washington Practice Series TM
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil
April 2022 Update
Washington State Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions
Part II. Negligence—Risk—Misconduct—Proximate Cause
Chapter 15. Proximate Cause
WPI 15.04 Negligence of Defendant Concurring With Other Causes
There may be more than one proximate cause of the same [injury] [event]. If you find that the defendant was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of injury or damage to the plaintiff, it is not a defense that [some other force] [some other cause] [or] [the act of some other person who is not a party to this lawsuit] may also have been a proximate cause.
[However, if you find that the sole proximate cause of injury or damage to the plaintiff was [some other force] [some other cause] [or] [the act of some other person who is not a party to this lawsuit] then your verdict should be for the defendant.]
NOTE ON USE
Use bracketed material as applicable.
Use this instruction when an act of some person who is not a party to the suit, or when some other event, happening, or condition, may have concurred with negligence of a defendant to constitute a proximate cause.
Use the second paragraph only if there is evidence tending to show that the sole proximate cause of the injury or damage was some other event, or the act of some person not a party to the lawsuit.
Do not use this instruction if the third person was acting as an agent of either the plaintiff or defendant.
If two or more defendants are sued and one or more may be liable and others not liable, use WPI 41.03 (Two or More Defendants—Different Legal Duties).
With this instruction, use WPI 41.04 (Fault to Be Apportioned), WPI 20.01 (Issues) (stating the charges of negligence), and either WPI 15.01 (Proximate Cause—Definition) or WPI 15.01.01 (Proximate Cause—Definition—Alternative).
COMMENT
This instruction is cited with approval in Estate of Keck v. Blair, 71 Wn. App. 105, 111 n.2, 856 P.2d 740 (1993).
Multiple proximate causes. There may be more than one proximate cause for the same injury. The acts of different persons, though otherwise independent, may concur in producing the same injury. In such a case all would be liable. Whether or not the actors are held jointly or severally liable is dependent upon a number of factors set forth in RCW 4.22.030 and 4.22.070 (both enacted as part of the 1986 Tort Reform Act).
The acts of an entity not a party to the suit or any other occurrence or condition is no excuse for the negligence of a defendant if that negligence is one of the concurring proximate causes. Ringaard v. Allen Lubricating Co., 147 Wash. 653, 267 P. 43 (1928); Hellan v. Supply Laundry Co., 94 Wash. 683, 686, 163 P. 9 (1917). However, pursuant to RCW 4.22.070(1), the acts of a third entity not a party to the suit may limit the monetary amount of a defendant's liability. For further discussion of negligence of defendant concurring with other causes, see Estate of Keck v. Blair, 71 Wn.App. 105, 110–113, 856 P.2d 740 (1993).
Concurrence of intentional and negligent conduct. In Tegman v. Accident & Medical Investigations, Inc., 150 Wn.2d 102, 119–20, 75 P.3d 497 (2003), the Washington Supreme Court held that the Tort Reform Act requires that a jury segregate damages caused by intentional tortfeasors from those caused by negligent tortfeasors. How best to instruct the jury on this process is not yet settled. In one of only two published Washington cases addressing this subject, the Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's jury instruction that stated:
In calculating a damage award, you must not include any damages that were caused by acts of the unknown assailants and not proximately caused by negligence of the defendant. Any damages caused solely by the unknown assailants and not proximately caused by negligence of defendant King County must be segregated from and not made a part of any damage award against King County.
Rollins v. King County Metro Transit, 148 Wn.App. 370, 379, 199 P.3d 499 (2009). In approving this instruction, the court observed:
How to instruct on damages will often depend upon the circumstances of the case, which is one reason for the discretion invested in the trial judge. Here, the practical question was how to focus the jury upon the damages caused by the negligent defendant. The instructions accomplished that and properly stated the law.
Rollins v. King County Metro Transit, 148 Wn.App. at 382.
In Jane Doe v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 141 Wn.App. 407, 440–41, 167 P. 3d 1193 (2007), the Court of Appeals held it was error to instruct the jury that the defendant bore the burden of proving divisibility or segregation of damages.
When instruction is necessary. An instruction setting forth the legal effect of multiple proximate causes is necessary when both sides raise complex theories of multiple causation or claim that the negligence of the other party was the proximate cause of the accident. Goucher v. J.R. Simplot Co., 104 Wn.2d 662, 676–77, 709 P.2d 774 (1985); Brashear v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., Inc., 100 Wn.2d 204, 207, 667 P.2d 78 (1983). Failure to give WPI 15.04 may be reversible error even though WPI 15.01 (Proximate Cause—Definition) is given including the bracketed last paragraph. WPI 15.01 (Proximate Cause—Definition) fails to inform the jury that the act of another person does not excuse the defendant's negligence unless the other party's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. See Brashear v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 100 Wn.2d 208, 667 P.2d 78 (1983), (failure to give WPI 15.04, formerly numbered 12.04, was reversible error); Jones v. Robert E. Bayley Const. Co., Inc., 36 Wn.App. 357, 361–62, 674 P.2d 679, overruled on other grounds, 102 Wn.2d 235 (1984) (failure to give WPI 15.04, formerly numbered 12.04, was error, but harmless given the jury's special verdict findings).
In Hoglund v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 50 Wn.App. 360, 368–69, 749 P.2d 164 (1987), the trial court did not err in failing to give the second paragraph of WPI 15.04 because the complaining party did not offer an instruction that included this paragraph.
[Current as of September 2018.]
End of Document