Honorable Dana Criswell

*1 Attorney General Jim Hood has received your request for an official opinion and assigned it to me for research and response.

*1 Your letter sets out various facts concerning the operation and leasing of a coliseum and convention center in Desoto County known as the Lander's Center. The Lander's Center is owned by Desoto County and under the management of the Desoto County Convention and Visitors Bureau (“Visitors Bureau”). You note a recent email exchange in which the Executive Director of the Visitors Bureau stated:

*1 Your question posed is:

*1 As an initial matter, we cannot answer your question as posed to us. The question asks us to opine as to the legal rights of private individuals and, specifically, as to rights that may be granted to them by a contract/lease/rental agreement with a governmental entity. As a general matter, our opinions are limited to advising public officials regarding questions of state law concerning prospective actions those officials propose to take. We do not, by official opinion, opine on contractual matters, nor can we adjudicate the rights of any party to a contract. More broadly, we read your question to ask about the authority of a governmental entity to contract for the lease or rental of governmental property wherein the agreement gives the right to control possession of weapons to the private lessor or renter.

*1 As a general matter, a lessor and lessee can agree, unless otherwise prohibited by law, as to the terms and conditions on which a lease agreement is entered. A lease is generally defined to mean a “contract by which one owning such property grants to another the right to possess, use, and enjoy it for specified period of time in exchange for periodic payment of a stipulated price, referred to as rent.” Facilities, Inc. v. Rogers-Usry Chevrolet, Inc., 907 So. 2d 960, 964 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd, 908 So. 2d 107 (Miss. 2005)(citing Black's Law Dictionary, Abridged Sixth Edition, 1991, Page 615). Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, defines “lease” as a “contract for exclusive possession of lands or tenements for [a] determinate period.” The essence of a lease is that a leasehold interest in real estate is granted, and during the period of the lease, the real estate is under the control of the lessee. We generally discussed this in a prior opinion as follows:

*2 MS AG Op., Lance (June 13, 2013)(emphasis added).

*2 Thus, it is our opinion that, as a general matter, a lease of public property to a private entity can and, in the absence of either a contract provision or provision of law to the contrary, would grant the lessee the right to control the possession of weapons on the property¹ during the term of the lease/rental. We are aware of no law that would prohibit our conclusion or this right of a lessee. We note that there are no legislative pronouncements on point in this area of the gun laws. However, the only legislative action we have found tends to support our conclusion. Section 45-9-101(13), which relates to concealed carry prohibitions, states that the “person or entity exercising control over the physical location” of property can prohibit the carrying of concealed firearms by posting a sign that the “carrying of a pistol or revolver is prohibited.” Section 45-9-53 prohibits a county or municipality from using this provision except in limited circumstances. However, once a county or municipality leases property, that entity is no longer in its control unless such right is reserved under the agreement. Absent such a reservation, it is the lessee who is in control of the premises, and Section 45-9-53 does not prevent a private lessee from posting signs. These statutes are limited in their application, because they apply to concealed weapons; but, as a general matter, they support the premise that a tenant has control over how his or her leased property is used.

*2 Thus, our general opinion is that a private party leasing a facility, as a general matter, has the right to restrict the possession of weapons on the property during the period of the agreement. However, we cannot anticipate each situation that may arise, so we can only opine in the most general manner and caveat our opinion with the warning that any number of facts could change our opinion. Likewise, applicable statutes, ordinances and contractual provisions could affect our opinion.

*3 Your letter also asks us to opine whether a long-term versus short-term lease and whether an event is considered a public versus private event would determine the answer. These types of fact-dependent questions are beyond the purview of an official opinion. Indeed, it would be virtually impossible to account for and identify every potential situation and then discuss it. Moreover, the determinative legal issue appears to be who is in control of the premises and not necessarily the nature of the event. As demonstrated above, a typical lease transfers this type of control to a lessee. However, even the question of control could and likely would turn on either a factual determination or an interpretation of a lease agreement. Both contract and factual issues are beyond the scope of our official opinions.

*3 If this office can be of further assistance, do not hesitate to contact us.