Mr. John H. Holley

Office of the Attorney GeneralMarch 6, 1957

1957 WL 93140 (Iowa A.G.)
Office of the Attorney General
State of Iowa
*1 [No Docket Number]
*1 March 6, 1957
*1 SCHOOL RESIDENCE is not the same as legal domicile but depends on “actual residence” which in turn depends upon determination by the local board, subject to appeal under Chapter 290, of the purpose in fact for which the child is present in the school district.
*1 Mr. John H. Holley
*1 Butler County Attorney
*1 Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of February 28th relative to residence for school purposes of a person of school age who is employed on a farm and resides with his employer rather than his parents. You submit the following question:
*1 “The question raised is this: Can the young man be said to be a resident of the district where his employer resides so that the school district where the employer resides is obligated to pay his tuition and transportation costs to its designated school, which is Clarksville? Or is the young man a resident of the town of Greene, where his parents reside, and thus is obligated to attend the Greene school, if he is to be educated at public expense?”
*1 In answer thereto we would refer you to Section 282.6, Code 1954, which provides that “Every school shall be free of tuition to all actual residents between the ages of five and twenty-one years ... “. Residence for school purposes is not the same as legal domicile. A temporary residence if not taken for the primary purpose of obtaining free schooling may be sufficient for school privileges (including those of attending high school under the provisions of Section 282.17, Code 1954). See 1934 Report of the Attorney General, page 238. Also see Carbon District v. Adams Co., 221 Iowa 1047 and Mount Hope School District v. Hendrickson, 197 Iowa 191. A general statement of what is held to constitute “actual residence” appears at 26 L.R.A. 581 as follows:
*1 “So far as a rule can be deduced from cases upon this subject it seems to be that a child is entitled to the benefits of the public schools in the district in which it lives if it has gone there in good faith for the purpose of acquiring a home and not for the purpose of taking advantage of school privileges. But that it will not be permitted to go into a district chiefly for the purpose of getting school advantages.”
*1 The questions of “good faith” and “primary purpose” are, of course, questions of fact to be determined in the first instance in each case by the local school board of the district where actual residence is claimed. In the event of an adverse ruling by the local board the appeal procedure provided in Chapter 290 may be followed to determine the question of actual residence.
*1 Norman A. Erbe
*1 Attorney General
1957 WL 93140 (Iowa A.G.)
End of Document