Ted Stilwill John P. Sarcone

*1 You have both requested opinions of the Attorney General interpreting how an amendment to the Open Meetings Law which expands the definition of “governmental bodies” applies to advisory committees appointed by schools boards and county boards of supervisors, respectively. The amendment, approved on April 15, 1993, adds a new category to the definition of governmental bodies in Iowa Code § 21.2(1), providing as follows:

*1 1993 Iowa Acts ch. 25, § 1 (S.F.319) (to be codified at Iowa Code § 21.2(1)(h)).

*1 Both inquiries focus on the words “created by an executive order of a political subdivision of this state.” The request from the Department of Education first specifically asks “whether a school board has the authority to issue an executive order, and, if so, what constitutes an executive order by the school board.” In posing this question, the requestor reminds us that Iowa school districts do not operate by home rule, but rather possess only those powers expressly granted by the legislature or necessarily incident to those expressly granted. See Sioux City Community School District v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction, 402 N.W.2d 739, 741 (Iowa 1987). Second, if school boards are not considered to be issuing executive orders when appointing committees to gather information, review alternatives and make recommendations, then the requestor asks:

*2 Third, the Department of Education questions whether the term “political subdivision” refers only to the school board or encompasses school officials, such that committees appointed by the superintendent would be subject to the amendment.

*2 In the same vein, Mr. Sarcone inquires whether “this provision applies to advisory boards or committees appointed by a county board of supervisors” given that such boards do not act by “executive order,” but rather “exercise a power or perform a duty only by passage of a motion, a resolution, an amendment or an ordinance” under Iowa Code § 331.302(1).

*2 It is our opinion that advisory bodies appointed by school boards and county boards of supervisors to develop and make recommendations on public policy issues are included within the expanded open meetings coverage despite use of the phrase “created by executive order.” We believe that use of the term “executive order” confines the authority to create such advisory committees to those elected entities with final executive authority for the political subdivision, rather than restricting the manner in which such advisory committees are created.

*2 As the Department of Education notes in its request, the governor's power to issue executive orders is provided in numerous code sections. See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 1.17 (order accepting cession of federal jurisdiction over lands); 7.20 (order directing agencies to lease vacant buildings); 17A.2 (defining certain executive orders as rules under Administrative Procedures Act); 17A.6(b) (proclamations and executive orders by governor to be published in Iowa Administrative Law Bulletin); 473.8 (orders responding to energy emergency). Both requestors point out that the legislature has not explicitly provided the authority to issue executive orders to political subdivisions. Nevertheless, the drafters' inexact use of the term “executive order” must not serve as an excuse to defeat the manifest intent of the legislature.

*2 The polestar of statutory construction is the search for the true intention of the legislature. American Home Products v. Iowa State Board of Tax Review, 302 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Iowa 1983). By passing this amendment, the legislature clearly aimed to extend open meeting mandates to both advisory bodies created by state government action and advisory bodies created by local government action. The legislature's desire can be detected from the development of the definition of “governmental bodies.”

*2 In the past, the definitions of “governmental bodies” have been limited to bodies possessing decisionmaking or policymaking authority. Boards and commissions which perform purely advisory functions have consistently been found outside the reach of Iowa's open meetings law. See, e.g., Donahue v. State, 474 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Iowa 1991) (faculty judicial panel is not governmental body because its findings are not binding on regents); 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. 148, 153 (peer review committee of the Board of Engineering Examiners not delegated any decisionmaking authority, thus not “governmental body”); 1988 Op. Att'y Gen 75 [#88-2-6(L)] (committee appointed by school board to make recommendation about distribution of “phase III” funds pursuant to Iowa Code § 294A.15 serves only advisory function and thus not subject to open meetings law).

*3 In 1989 the legislature amended the definition of “governmental bodies” to include “an advisory board, advisory commission, or task force created by the governor or the general assembly to develop and make recommendations on public policy issues.” Iowa Code § 21.2(1)(e). This office interpreted that amendment as applying only to advisory bodies formed to advise the governor or general assembly, and not to human growth and development resource committees created by statute to advise local school boards. Op. Att'y Gen. # 91-2- 3(L). That 1991 opinion highlighted the significantly different wording used by the legislature in subsections (e) and (a) of section 21.2(1), and concluded that “[i]f the legislature had intended to include all advisory commissions created •by statutes of this state' it would have used that terminology.”¹ Id.

*3 Apparently in response to that opinion, during its 1993 session, the legislature further amended section 21.2(1) to include not only all advisory committees created by the statutes of this state or by executive order, but all those created by a comparable enactment of the political subdivisions of this state. The term “executive order” appears in both halves of the amendment. To give the latter half of the amendment no effect because the inclusion of the term “executive order” creates some ambiguity would be contrary to the rules of statutory construction. Iowa Code § 4.4(2). The legislature is presumed to have enacted each part of a statute for a purpose and to have intended that each part be given effect. Hammer v. Branstad, 463 N.W.2d 86, 92 (Iowa 1990) (refusing to render section of comparable worth law meaningless as to the only category of employees to which it applied).

*3 To resolve the ambiguity presented by the legislative juxtaposition of “executive order” and “political subdivision,” we may seek guidance from the statutory preamble or policy statements. See DeMore by DeMore v. Dieters, 334 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa 1983); see also Iowa Code § 4.6(7). The open meetings law expressly states: “[a]mbiguity in the construction or application of this chapter should be resolved in favor of openness.” Iowa Code § 21.1; see Donahue, 474 N.W.2d at 539 (open meetings law to be liberally construed to prevent “star chamber” sessions of public bodies). Thus, we conclude that the legislature intended to extend coverage of the open meetings law to certain advisory bodies created by political subdivisions.

*3 Another maxim of statutory construction is that words are generally given their common meaning. Peterson v. Schwertly, 460 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Iowa 1990). When in doubt, Iowa courts have looked to dictionary definitions of words in question. See Smith v. City of Fort Dodge, 160 N.W.2d 492, 497-98 (Iowa 1968) (meaning of “substantial”). An “executive order” is commonly defined as “a rule or order having the force of law issued by an executive authority of a government, usually under power granted by a constitution or delegated by legislation.” Webster's New International Dictionary Unabridged (3d ed. 1966). Both the governor and local elected boards possess final authority to execute certain laws.

*4 The governor's power to issue executive orders arises from article IV, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution, stating that the governor “shall take care that the laws are faithfully executed” and from specific legislative grants. See 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. 87 (governor has no prerogative powers, but possesses only such powers and duties as are vested in the office by constitutional or statutory grant); see also Note, Gubernatorial Executive Orders as Devices for Administrative Direction and Control, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 78, 85 (1964) (four legal bases exist for issuance of executive orders: general and specific constitutional authority; general and specific statutory authority).

*4 By the same measure, school district boards of directors and county boards of supervisors are empowered by statute to conduct the affairs of their respective political subdivisions. See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 274.1, 274.7, 279.8 (directors of school corporation shall exercise all powers granted by law and shall make rules for its own government and that of the directors, officers, employees, teachers and pupils); Iowa Code § 331.301(1) and (2) (county board of supervisors may “exercise any power and perform any function it deems appropriate to protect and preserve the rights, privileges, and property of the county or of its residents, and to preserve and improve the peace, safety, health, welfare and comfort, and convenience of its residents”). Thus, as executive authorities of political subdivisions, school boards and boards of supervisors may take administrative action analogous to the governor's executive orders. See generally Salisbury Laboratories v. Iowa Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 276 N.W.2d 830, 835-36 (court took judicial notice of two indicia of executive order issued by DEQ: (1) order issued as public document and (2) issued pursuant to statute).

*4 Having thus concluded that advisory committees appointed by school boards and county boards of supervisors may be subject to the open meetings law under the amended definition of “governmental bodies,” we must not be “oblivious to the practical effect” of our statutory construction. AFSCME v. State, 484 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Iowa 1992); see Iowa Code § 4.4(3) (1993). We doubt that the legislature intended to pull every informal, ad hoc group formed at the behest of a local public official under the open meetings law. See Emmetsburg Ready Mix Co. v. Norris, 362 N.W.2d 498, 499 (Iowa 1985) (spirit of statute must be considered, as well as the words; construction should be sensible, workable, logical; inconvenience and absurdity should be avoided).

*4 Where, then, is the line to be drawn between advisory committees that constitute “governmental bodies” under the amendment and those exempt by practical necessity? The Department of Education's third question presupposes a useful dividing line. We do not believe that the legislature intended the term “political subdivisions” to encompass individuals such as superintendents or other school administrators. Such individuals would be considered employees of a political subdivision. See Iowa Code § 279.20, see also Iowa Code s 68B.2(21).

*5 The legislature apparently used “political subdivision” in subsection (h) as shorthand for “a board, council, commission, or other governing body of a political subdivision” as used in section 21.2(1)(b). Accordingly, a functional interpretation of “executive order” is an order or rule issued by the governing body of a political subdivision, that is the popularly elected body with final executive authority, comparable to the governor on a state level. Thus, elected school boards possess authority to issue such orders, while board-appointed superintendents do not. As a result, the term “executive order” as used in the legislative amendment delimits the entities capable of creating this new variety of “governmental bodies,” as opposed to modifying the means by which such advisory committees are created.

*5 This reading of “created by an executive order of a political subdivision” is consistent with our interpretation of “formally and directly created” as used in subsection (c). This office has construed “formally and directly” to mean created by the vote of a delegating body upon a resolution or motion or equivalent means, but not constituted or appointed by an intermediary or representative of that delegating body such as an executive director or secretary. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. 148, 150-51.

*5 Finally, not all advisory committees created by governing bodies of political subdivisions will be subject to the open meetings law pursuant to new subsection (h). Only those advisory committees created “to develop and make recommendations on public policy issues” will be considered “governmental bodies.” For instance, a task force created to measure the extent of a problem and deliver raw data to the board of supervisors or school board would not be covered because it would not be charged with recommending any particular course of action. On the other hand, we do not see the phrase “public policy issues” as limiting the application of the amendment, given that governing bodies of political subdivisions consider nothing but public policy issues. See Iowa Code §§ 331.301(1) (grant of home rule powers does not include power to enact private or civil law governing civil relationships); 274.1, 274.7, 279.8 (school board's authority is limited to school matters).

*5 In sum, it is our opinion that advisory bodies created by school boards and county boards of supervisors to develop and make recommendations on public policy issues are included within the expanded definition of governmental bodies subject to the Open Meetings Law, despite the legislature's use of the phrase “created by executive order of a political subdivision.” We conclude that “executive order” confines the authority to create such advisory committees to those elected entities with final executive authority for the political subdivision, rather than restricting the manner in which such advisory committees are created.