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AMI 2438 Defense—Estoppel

Arkansas Supreme Court Committee On Jury Instructions-Civil

Ark. Model Jury Instr., Civil AMI 2438

Arkansas Model Jury Instructions-Civil

December 2023 Update

Arkansas Supreme Court Committee On Jury Instructions-Civil

Chapter 24. Contracts

Defenses

AMI 2438 Defense—Estoppel

[Defendant] contends that [plaintiff] should be estopped from claiming a breach of contract and has the burden of proving each of four essential propositions:

First, [plaintiff] knew (state the particular fact(s) on which the estoppel is based);

Second, [plaintiff] reasonably should have expected that [defendant] would act upon [his][her][its][words] or [conduct];

Third, [defendant] was unaware of (state the particular fact(s) on which the estoppel is based); and

Fourth, [defendant] relied in good faith upon [plaintiff]'s [words][conduct][or][silence] to [his][her][its] detriment.

[If you find from the evidence in this case that each of these propositions has been proved, then your verdict should be for [defendant]].

NOTE ON USE

If the defense of estoppel is based solely on the silence of the plaintiff, modify this instruction as indicated in the Comment.

The facts that are the basis of the alleged estoppel should be stated briefly and neutrally.

Do not use the bracketed paragraph if the case is submitted on interrogatories.

COMMENT

The elements of estoppel were stated in Bedford v. Fox, 333 Ark. 509, 970 S.W.2d 251 (1998), and more recently in Evans v. Hamby, 2011 Ark. 69. Estoppel involves conduct of both parties. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Stanley, 263 Ark. 638, 569 S.W.2d 653 (1978) (distinguishing estoppel from waiver).

Silence may give rise to an estoppel defense. In order for silence alone to constitute an estoppel, there must be both the opportunity and the duty to speak, the action of the person asserting the estoppel must be the natural result of the silence, and the silent person must have been in a situation to know that someone was relying on the silence to his injury. First National Bk. v. Godbey & Sons, 181 Ark. 1004, 1110, 29 S.W.2d 271, 275 (1930) (plaintiff not estopped from recovering from the defendant bank where the plaintiffs did nothing to mislead the bank or induce its action). See also Anadarko Petroleum Co. v. Venable, 312 Ark. 330, 341–342, 850 S.W.2d 302, 308 (1993) (plaintiff not barred from suit by signing royalty division order which did not ratify the calculation of the share given to the plaintiff); Lavaca School Dis. No. 3 v. Charleston School Dist. No. 9, 304 Ark. 104, 800 S.W.2d 703 (1990) (silence alone constituted grounds for the estoppel where the plaintiff district did not complain for forty years to the defendant's collection of taxes from the disputed territory). In cases in which silence alone is alleged as grounds for the estoppel, two modifications to the instruction should be made:

The second element should be replaced with the following:
Second, the circumstances were such that [plaintiff] reasonably should have known that [defendant] was relying on his silence, and [plaintiff] had the opportunity to speak and under the circumstances should have spoken;
Following the fourth element, insert:
Fifth, [defendant's] action was the natural result of the [plaintiff's] silence.

The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that the right to jury trial exists with regard to the defense of estoppel, stating “[o]ur case law is quite clear that estoppel in pais or equitable estoppel may be pled in both courts of equity and courts of law.” Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Heslip, 302 Ark. 310, 312–13, 790 S.W.2d 152, 153 (1990) (reversing the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the defense of estoppel pled in the case). For a discussion of the right to jury trial for the claim of promissory estoppel, see AMI 2444, Comment.

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